In a case of first impression, DLA Piper argued before the US Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware that a consent provision in a Delaware LLC operating agreement effectively granting a creditor a veto right over a debtor’s decision to file for bankruptcy was void because it was contrary to federal public policy.
Who doesn’t love a good catch-all provision? In a world of infinite possibilities, attorneys often find themselves drafting language designed to encompass a plethora of contingencies. Are such efforts sometimes overkill? Perhaps. Nevertheless, given our imperfect ability to predict the future, such provisions are often necessary and appropriate.
On May 16, 2016, the United States Supreme Court in Husky International Electronics v. Ritz held that the phrase “actual fraud” under section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code may include fraudulent transfer schemes that were effectuated without a false representation. Section 523(a)(2)(A) provides that an individual debtor will not be discharged from certain debts to the extent that those debts were obtained by false pretenses, false representations or actual fraud.
A debtor’s pre-bankruptcy repurchase of its stock for $150 million was not a fraudulent transfer because the debtor “could have sold off enough of its assets or alternatively obtained sufficient credit to continue its business for the foreseeable future,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on June 15, 2016. In re Adelphia Communications Corp., 2016 WL3315847, *2 (2d Cir. June 15, 2016). Affirming the lower courts, the Second Circuit stressed that “the issue of adequate capitalization,” the “sole issue presented on appeal ...
I. Introduction
In a June 3, 2016 decision1 , the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (“the Bankruptcy Court”) invalidated, on federal public policy grounds, a provision in the debtorLLC’s operating agreement that it viewed as hindering the LLC’s right to file for bankruptcy. Such provision provided that the consent of all members of the LLC, including a creditor holding a so-called “golden share” received pursuant to a forbearance agreement, was required for the debtor to commence a voluntary bankruptcy case.
On March 9, 2016, Bankruptcy Judge Shelley Chapman of the Southern District of New York issued her decision on the Debtor’s motion to reject certain contracts in Sabine Oil & Gas Corporation’s Chapter 11 case.[i] The decision, which allowed Sabine to reject “gathering agreements”
In a world of free-ranging capital and cross-border transactions, the question of whether US courts will apply US law to transactions taking place in other countries is important. It is therefore a matter of both interest and concern that judges in the Southern District of New York have reached opposite conclusions when asked to give extraterritorial effect to the avoidance or 'clawback' provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.
Canon of statutory construction
As an example of the conflicting and contrasting court rulings on the effect of surrender in bankruptcy (see our prior update), the District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida, Fifth District, recently dismissed a borrower’s appeal from a final judgment of foreclosure because the borrower admitted during the course of his bankruptcy proceeding that he owed the mortgage debt and stated his intention to surrender the mortgage
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida recently denied a creditor’s motion to compel the debtor to surrender mortgaged property and also denied the debtor’s motion to stay the case, holding that a chapter 7 debtor who indicates surrender of real property in his statement of intention is not obligated to surrender that property to the lienholder, whether or not the property is administered by the chapter 7 trustee.