A contractual waiver of an entity’s right to file for bankruptcy is generally invalid as a matter of public policy. Nonetheless, lenders sometimes attempt to prevent a borrower from seeking bankruptcy protection by conditioning financing on a covenant, bylaw, or corporate charter provision that restricts the power of the borrower’s governing body to authorize such a filing. One such restriction—a lender-designated “special member” with the power to block a bankruptcy filing—was recently invalidated by the court in In re Lake Mich.

Essentially all securitization structures utilize a bankruptcy remote entity, a/k/a special purpose entity (“SPE”), to reduce the lenders’ or investors’ exposure to a bankruptcy of the sponsor. A standard feature of SPEs is the appointment of an independent person (director, member, manager) to the body managing the SPEs. That independent person’s consent is required for “major decisions,” one of which is the filing of, or consenting to a bankruptcy of the SPE (hence the court’s reference to them as “blocking directors”).

Even before Congress added section 365(c)(3) to the Bankruptcy Code in 1984, it was generally understood that a nonresidential real property lease which has been validly terminated under applicable law prior to a bankruptcy filing by the debtor-former tenant cannot be assumed or assigned in bankruptcy. Moreover, the terminated leasehold interest is excluded from the debtor’s bankruptcy estate, and any action by the landlord to obtain possession of the formerly leased premises is not prohibited by the automatic stay.

In a much-anticipated follow-up to its 2014 decision in Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 738 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2014), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently held that there is no irreconcilable conflict between the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and the Bankruptcy Code.

In most financing transactions, particularly project finance transactions, lenders seek to obtain security over all of a borrower’s assets. One crucial asset that sometimes does not get sufficient attention is insurance proceeds. Lenders are accustomed to ensuring access to the borrower’s insurance coverage through “additional insured” or “loss payee” provisions.

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015) Key Issue: Post-Stern v. Marshall, whether a Bankruptcy Court (as an Art. I court) has a proper delegation of authority from the District Court (as an Art. III court) to enter findings of fact and final orders on non-core issues upon the consent of the parties and, if so, whether consent must be express or may be implied? Holding: In a 5/1/3 opinion, relying heavily on Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U. S.

Imagine that you are an unsecured lender who has learned that a borrower has filed for bankruptcy and has little to no assets available to pay creditors. Is there any way to prevent your debt from being extinguished? This is a common question and often the answer unfortunately is no; however, if the debtor is an individual and the debt meets certain requirements established by the Bankruptcy Code, the court may declare the debt nondischargeable (in other words, the debt will remain with the debtor after the bankruptcy case is closed).

In a brief, 4-page decision released May 26, 2016, Judge Gross of the Delaware Bankruptcy Court granted a motion for summary judgment, barring state court litigation in California on the grounds of res judicata. Judge Gross’ opinion is available here (the “Opinion”).

One of the goals of the Bankruptcy Code is to provide a debtor with a fresh start. The discharge of prepetition debts at the conclusion of a bankruptcy case is one of the most important ways to attain this fresh start.  On May 16, 2016, the Supreme Court made it harder for debtors to obtain a fresh start by broadening an exception to discharge.

Perhaps Next Time the Debtor Will Speak Up a Little Sooner