We at the Bankruptcy Cave are not very surprised by the ruling yesterday in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. The Supreme Court in Jevic reviewed a Bankruptcy Court’s decision to approve a settlement (with a distribution of proceeds that contravened the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme) in conjunction with dismissing the bankruptcy case of the Chapter 11 debtor Jevic Holding Corp.

A potential threat to the Code’s priority scheme is the allowance of “structured dismissals,” which include a settlement as part of the dismissal of the chapter 11 case that would distribute estate assets in a manner that contravenes the Code’s priority rules.

This second installment of our series, “The Life Settlement Industry – Bankruptcy Issues”, will address two related issues:

(1) What type of interest (if any) does an investor-creditor have in a “life settlement” (i.e., a life insurance policy sold by the original owner to a third party for a value in excess of the policy’s cash surrender value, but less than its death benefit), and (2) How is the interest of an investor-creditor in a life settlement generally determined in a bankruptcy case?

On March 22, 2017, the Supreme Court, in Czyzewski et al., v. Jevic Holding Corp., et al., confirmed that the Bankruptcy Code does not permit “priority skipping” in Chapter 11 structured dismissals. In doing so, the Court held that, although the Code does not explicitly provide what, if any, priority rules apply to the distribution of estate assets in a Chapter 11 structured dismissal, “[a] distribution scheme in connection with the dismissal of a Chapter 11 case cannot, without the consent of the affected parties, deviate from the basic priority rules that apply under the . . .

In a widely anticipated ruling, the Supreme Court in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. ruled that bankruptcy courts “may not approve structured dismissals that provide for distributions that do not follow ordinary priority rules without the consent of affected creditors.” In doing so, the Court rejected the Third Circuit’s ruling that the circumstances were an unusual “rare case,” justifying deviation from the ordinary priority rules.

The U.S. Supreme Court held today in a 6 to 2 decision that “structured dismissals” resolving Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings cannot deviate from the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme without the consent of the affected parties – which means that businesses must ensure workers receive their unpaid wages as part of any such resolution. Specifically, the Court rejected a structured dismissal that left a group of WARN Act plaintiffs without any compensation, telling employers, essentially, that they must squeeze blood from a stone to compensate their workers.

On February 27, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit joined a minority approach followed by District of Columbia Circuit: failing to turn over property after demand is not a violation of the automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362. WD Equipment v. Cowen (In re Cowen), No. 15-1413, — F.3d —-, 2017 WL 745596 (10th Cir. Feb. 27, 2017), opinion here.

Value of Determining Critical Vendors

As defined in bankruptcy lexicon, critical vendors are those that are vital to a Debtor’s continued operations. A critical vendor provides goods or services that cannot be easily and efficiently replaced, or rather a vendor with a specialized skillset, mandatory safety certification or proprietary product whose discontinuation of service would have a significant negative impact on a Debtor’s operations.

Foreign financial institutions that trade dollar-denominated securities on the secondary market may not appreciate that they could be forced to defend an action arising from such a transaction in a U.S. court. That is what happened, however, to an Austrian bank that purchased a $10 million interest in a syndicated $1.5 billion term loan on the secondary market. In a recent decision, the bankruptcy court in Motors Liquidation Co. Avoidance Action Trust v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (In re Motors Liquidation Co.), Adv. Pro. No. 09-00504 (MG), 2017 WL 632126 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb.

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