The Supreme Court of Indiana recently confirmed a mortgagee’s ability to seek an in rem judgment against property for which there was an outstanding lien balance after the borrowers obtained a discharge of their Chapter 7 bankruptcy.

In so ruling, the Court distinguished the difference between an in rem and in personam judgment, and rejected the borrowers’ unsupported argument that the debt was paid in full by the time the mortgagee initiated foreclosure proceedings against the borrowers.

In Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding, 580 U.S. __(2017), decided on March 22, the U.S. Supreme Court held that, without the consent of impaired creditors, a bankruptcy court cannot approve a "structured dismissal" that provides for distributions deviating from the ordinary priority scheme of the Bankruptcy Code. The ruling reverses the decisions of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware, and the U.S.

Kansas-based Payless, Inc. filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in the Eastern District of Missouri (St. Louis) on Tuesday afternoon, under docket # 17-42257.

On March 23, 2017, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida (the “Court”) issued an opinion in the chapter 15 case of Banco Cruzeiro do Sul, S.A., a Brazilian bank (“BCSUL” or the “Debtor”), holding, among other things, that section 1521(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Code does not prevent foreign representatives from commencing state law fraudulent conveyance actions. See Laspro Consultores LTDA v. Alinia Corp. (In re Massa Falida Do Banco Cruzeiro Do Sul S.A.), No. 14-22974-BKC-LMI, Adv. Pro. No. 16-01315-LMI, 2017 WL 1102814 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.

HIGHLIGHTS:

Can a bankruptcy court order the “structured dismissal” of a Chapter 11 case if such dismissal would alter the ordinary priority rules for creditor distributions under the Bankruptcy Code? In Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. (March 22, 2017) (Jevic), the Supreme Court recently determined that such an order cannot issue without consent from all affected creditors even in “rare cases in which courts could find sufficient reasons to disregard priority.”

We are all very used to (and very bored of) the on-going debate of what actually constitutes “the media” or “legitimate news.” In most instances, this sort of debate pits exclusive, Columbia-educated, “proper” journalists against those who have large on-line followings and eschew any association with a Dickensian-era newspaper.

When faced with a recalcitrant debtor, clients sometimes move too quickly to put the debtor into an involuntary bankruptcy, especially when fraudulent transfers and other creditor avoidance attempts become apparent. But creditors considering filing or joining in the filing of an involuntary bankruptcy petition, and the attorneys that represent them, have much to deliberate before becoming involved in an involuntary bankruptcy filing.

The U.S. Supreme Court ruled on March 22, 2017, in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., that without the consent of affected creditors, bankruptcy courts may not approve "structured dismissals" providing for distributions that "deviate from the basic priority rules that apply under the primary mechanisms the [Bankruptcy] Code establishes for final distributions of estate value in business bankruptcies."

In a 33 page decision released March 29, 2017, Judge Sontchi of the Delaware Bankruptcy Court ruled on competing motions to dismiss the remaining claims and counterclaims in an adversary proceeding in the Affirmative Insurance bankruptcy – Adversary Proceeding Case No. 16-50425.