The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently held that “escrow funds, insurance proceeds, or miscellaneous proceeds” are protected by the anti-modification provisions for Chapter 13 bankruptcies as “incidental property” under the definition of “debtor’s principal residence” in the federal Bankruptcy Code.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently held that a bank’s relationship with a software services company, under which the software services company required its customers to use the bank for the depositary services ancillary to the software, did not violate anti-tying provisions of the federal Bank Holding Company Act, at 12 U.S.C. § 1972.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit recently affirmed a bankruptcy court’s ruling that a mortgagee did not violate the discharge injunction in 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) by sending IRS 1099-A forms to borrowers after their discharge, agreeing that the IRS forms were not objectively coercive attempts to collect a debt.
A copy of the opinion in Bates v. CitiMortgage, Inc. is available at: Link to Opinion.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently held that a bank’s lawsuit against the husband of a debtor who had filed for bankruptcy did not violate the co-debtor stay because the husband’s credit card debts were not a consumer debt for which the debtor was personally liable.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit recently rejected a bankruptcy trustee’s effort to avoid a mortgage on the basis that the acknowledgment signed by the borrowers’ attorney-in-fact was defective under Massachusetts law, holding that the acknowledgment was not materially defective because as a matter of agency law the attorney-in-fact’s signature was the borrowers’ “free act and deed.”
The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Orlando Division recently ruled that debtors’ FCCPA and TCPA claims did not arise out of and were not related to their mortgage to fall under the jury waiver provisions in the mortgage where the claims arose out of attempts to enforce a debt that was discharged in bankruptcy.
The Court also ruled the debtors sufficiently stated a claim under FCCPA by alleging the creditor received notice of the debtors’ bankruptcy case to constitute actual knowledge the debtors’ were represented by counsel.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recently held that a secured party’s foreclosure did not discharge an otherwise valid security interest in the proceeds of the collateral, nor did it preclude the creditor from pursuing its rights to such proceeds.
In a split decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently held that “filing a proof of claim in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy based on a debt that is time-barred does not violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act when the statute of limitations does not extinguish the debt.”
On July 10, 2014, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit issued its opinion in Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC. That opinion began by decrying the “deluge” of proofs of claim filed by debt buyers on debts that are unenforceable under state statutes of limitations.
Filing a proof of claim with a bankruptcy court representing a debt subject to an expired state law limitations period does not violate the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) under an opinion released yesterday from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
Under the ruling, in Owens v. LVNV, the Seventh Circuit joins the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in rejecting the Eleventh Circuit’s holding under Crawford v. LVNV that such proofs of claim violate the FDCPA.