The unitranche financing market has expanded significantly in recent years. Generally, a unitranche deal involves two lenders (or groups of lenders) that provide financing on a “first out” and “last out” basis. In conjunction with the financing, the borrower grants one lien and enters into a single credit agreement and the lenders enter into an “Agreement Among Lenders” (“AAL”). An AAL is similar to an intercreditor agreement and provides for certain rights and remedies of the lenders.
© 2015 Hunton & Williams LLP 1 May 2015 Oak Rock Financial District Court Addresses the Applicable Legal Standard for True Participation Agreements The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York recently applied two tests, the True Participation Test and the Disguised Loan Test, to determine whether agreements were true participation agreements or disguised loans.1 In addition, the District Court noted that the most important question in such a determination is the risk of loss allocation in the transaction, and that if an alleged participant is not subject to the
In an opinion issued today, the Supreme Court held that debtors do not have the right to immediately appeal a bankruptcy court’s decision denying confirmation of a proposed reorganization plan. This decision resolves a circuit split, and confirms the balance of power between debtors and creditors in the plan confirmation process. As the Supreme Court explained, “the knowledge that [a debtor] will have no guaranteed appeal from a denial should encourage the debtor to work with creditors and the trustee to develop a confirmable plan as promptly as possible.”
In re Betchan, 524 B.R. 830 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 2015) –
A mortgagee was the highest bidder at a foreclosure sale that took place shortly before the debtor filed bankruptcy. The lender requested relief from the automatic stay in order to evict the debtor on the basis that transfer of the property was completed prepetition so that it was not part of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate.
Chief Judge Cecelia G. Morris of the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York decided that banks may not place an administrative freeze, even a temporary one, on the bank account of an individual who files for bankruptcy.
On March 31, U.S. Court of Appeals in the 11th Circuit concluded that the district court properly dismissed plaintiff’s FDCPA complaint, using the concept of judicial estoppel. Ward v. AMS Servicing, LLC, 2015 WL 1432982 (11th Cir. Mar.31, 2015). In this case, the court addressed whether the Defendant was incorrect in charging the Plaintiff a monthly mortgage amount agreed to in a consent order, rather than the amount stipulated in the Note.
Rev Op Group v. ML Manager LLC (In re Mortgages Ltd.), 771 F.3d 623 (9th Cir. 2014) –
Under the terms of a debtor’s confirmed plan of reorganization, an entity (ML Manager) was designated to manage the debtor’s portfolio of mortgage loans. The issue in this appeal was whether ML Manager was authorized to act as an agent for pass-through investors in selling loans over the objection of some of the investors.
Morris v. Ark Valley Credit Union (In re Gracy), 522 B.R. 686 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2015) –
A chapter 7 trustee sought to avoid a credit union’s security interest in a manufactured home by asserting his strong arm powers as a hypothetical lien creditor based on the lender’s failure to perfect its lien. The bankruptcy court declined to avoid the lien since it held there was no lien to avoid.
In a 2014 decision rued by debt collectors everywhere, the Eleventh Circuit in Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 758 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2014) ruled that filing a proof of claim to collect a time-barred debt in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”). Not surprisingly, the Crawford decision spawned a tidal wave of copycat claims based on the simple act of filing a proof of claim on a stale debt.