Who is the real holder of a FCRA claim brought by a Chapter 7 debtor? That’s the question that confronted the Eastern District of Wisconsin recently in Kitchner v. Fiergola, 2018 WL 4473359 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 18, 2018).

Under the facts of Kitchner, Plaintiff, Megan Kitchner, (“Kitchner”) alleged that the Kohn Law Firm of Milwaukee, Wisconsin (“Kohn”), violated the FCRA and the FDCPA by disclosing her credit score and credit report in a small-claims collection action filed on March 9, 2017.

Since the Delaware Supreme Court held in CML V, LLC v. Bax that creditors of a Delaware LLC lack standing to pursue derivative breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims, even if the LLC is insolvent or near insolvent, bankruptcy courts have decided a number of Bax-related issues in cases involving Delaware LLCs.

On July 31, 2018, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association published the ISDA 2018 US Resolution Stay Protocol. The US Protocol is intended to enable parties to ISDA Master Agreements and similar "Protocol Covered Agreements" (collectively, PCAs) to contractually recognize the cross-border application of special resolution regimes applicable to global systemically important entities and their affiliates.

In this alert, we provide a broad overview of the US Protocol and relevant resolution stay rules, then describe the effect and operation of the US Protocol.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-20(j) did not alter or limit the lender’s right to foreclose under the terms of the valid reverse mortgage contract where the non-borrower spouse was still living in the home.

Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s petition for injunctive relief to prevent the foreclosure sale.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently rejected an attempt by homeowners to collaterally attack a state court mortgage foreclosure judgment, affirming the trial court’s dismissal of an amended complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim, but on alternative grounds.

The Eleventh Circuit recently found in favor of Blue Bell Creameries, Inc. by rejecting its own earlier dicta and explicitly expanding the preference payment defense known as “new value.” This provides additional protection for companies doing business with a debtor in the 90 days prior to bankruptcy.

THE SCOOP: BRUNO’S V. BLUE BELL

On September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy, an event considered by many to mark the beginning of the credit crisis of 2008–2009 and the unprecedented public policy responses that followed. Much has been written about the multiple contributing factors to the crisis, ranging from predatory lending to Federal Reserve interest rate policy.

Two years ago, after a slew of bankruptcies in the energy sector triggered by a dramatic drop in commodity prices during the worst downturn for U.S. energy producers since the 1980’s, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) issued new guidance that proposed changes to underwriting analysis and loan risk rating determinations by national banks and federal savings associations of loans secured by oil and gas reserves (RBLs).

1 Driven by a concern that banks were not appropriately capturing risks associated with increased

Lehman’s ‘unknown unknowns’, and the secrets that came to light

This article was first published on the Financial Times website on 10 September 2018.

When the administrators and lawyers walked into the Bank Street offices of Lehman Brothers on a sunny Sunday afternoon ten years ago, little did they know the complexity of the task which awaited them.

For all their vast experience, legal knowledge and financial acumen, this was a major challenge.

Consider the common commercial loan collection situation: a business debt collateralized by relatively permanent collateral (real property or durable non-mobile equipment such as a printing press) and transient collateral (inventory, accounts receivable and cash).[1] Frequently, there is also potentially recoverable unsecured debt because the collateral is insufficient to pay the entire debt and (a) the collateral does not include all the borrower’s