The Supreme Court of Wisconsin recently held that claim preclusion does not bar a mortgagee from proceeding with a foreclosure complaint despite a prior litigation which resulted in a dismissal with prejudice if the subsequent litigation is based upon a default and acceleration which occurred after the initial foreclosure proceeding.

The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Merit Mgmt. Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., 138 S.Ct. 883 (2018), held that transfers made by and to entities that are not “financial institutions” or other covered entities fall outside of the scope of the § 546(e) safe harbor even if they are made through financial institutions or other covered entities. The Supreme Court’s decision resolves a circuit split over how the § 546(e) safe harbor applies to transactions involving conduit entities and could impact future disputes involving safe harbors under the Bankruptcy Code.

The District Court of Appeal for the Fifth District of Florida recently denied a motion to reconsider an order awarding appellate attorney’s fees to borrowers who were the prevailing party on appeal, reversing judgment of foreclosure entered in favor of the mortgagee.

The Supreme Court of New York, Suffolk County, recently granted a foreclosing plaintiff summary judgment and held that plaintiff did not need to send a 90-day notice pursuant to RPAPL 1304 because plaintiff was not a lender, assignee, or mortgage loan servicer. SeeNIC Holding Corp. v. Eisenegger, 59 Misc. 3d 1221(A) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018). In the case, one of plaintiff’s employees was relocating and defendant wanted to purchase the employee’s home.

The District Court of Appeal for the Second District of Florida recently affirmed an order involuntarily dismissing an action to foreclose a second mortgage which secured a home equity line of credit.

In so ruling, the Appellate Court upheld the trial court’s holding that the promissory note for the relevant home equity line of credit was not admissible into evidence because it was nonnegotiable, and thus, not a self-authenticating instrument.

In Citibank, N.A., London Branch v Oceanwood Opportunities Master Fund and others, the English High Court recently addressed what constitutes “control” for purposes of the disenfranchisement clause ubiquitous in New York law indentures. While the Court determined that “control” is necessarily a fact-based question to be viewed in light of the particular circumstances, the judgment offers several helpful conclusions which will be good news to any lenders having or seeking control positions in note tranches.

Facts of the case

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that where a mortgagee rescinded a notice of intent to accelerate and then filed a foreclosure action without first issuing a new notice of intent to accelerate, it failed to meet its burden to show clear and unequivocal notice of intent to accelerate prior to filing suit, and therefore was not entitled to foreclosure judgment.

Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit reversed the ruling of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of the bank, and dismissed the foreclosure action.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently vacated a trial court’s dismissal of a mortgagee’s deficiency claims and remanded to the trial court to determine whether the voluntary dismissal of a bankrupt debtor’s Chapter 11 case without a discharge had any effect on the mortgagee’s right to pursue its pre-petition deficiency claims.

On March 1, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that a condominium association acting on its six-month super-priority lien for unpaid condominium fees may not perform its foreclosure sale while leaving the property subject to a first deed of trust lien, even if the terms of the sale stated that the condo unit could be sold subject to the first deed of trust. The D.C.

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals recently held that a condominium association acting on its six-month super-priority lien for unpaid condominium assessments pursuant to § 42-1903.13(a)(2) of the District of Columbia Condominium Act (the “D.C. Condo Act”) may not conduct its foreclosure sale subject to a first deed of trust lien, even if the terms of sale stated that the condo unit would be sold subject to first deed of trust.