In response to the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic in Australia in 2020, the federal government injected an unprecedented level of stimulus into the Australian economy and introduced temporary law reforms aimed at protecting against an anticipated "tidal wave" of insolvencies. These temporary law reforms included a moratorium on civil liability for insolvent trading for directors and increased thresholds and time frames for responding to statutory demands.

During the better part of 2020, the federal government has injected an unprecedented level of stimulus into the Australian economy in an attempt to mitigate the economic impact of COVID-19. As a result, despite a significant contraction in the Australian economy, roughly half as many Australian companies are entering insolvency processes today compared with the same time last year. As that stimulus is wound back, it seems inevitable that the number of insolvencies will rise.

In Short

The Situation: In Australia, the Takeovers Panel ("Panel") is the primary forum for hearing disputes in relation to takeover bids and other corporate control transactions involving public companies. In light of the current COVID-19-led financial distress being experienced by many companies, understanding when the Panel will be the appropriate forum to consider disputes in relation to a company in administration is important. This question arose in the course of the current Virgin Australia Group administration.

Introduction

On Tuesday 10 June 2014 in the Australian Capital Territory Industrial Magistrates Court, an early mention in the Kenoss Contractors case was heard.  This case includes a prosecution of both an organisation for allegedly failing to meet the primary health and safety duty and an officer for allegedly failing to exercise due diligence under the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (ACT) which commenced on 1 January 2012.  This case is ostensibly the first prosecution of an officer under the new harmonised WHS laws.

Introduction  

Another failed property developer has just been made bankrupt in Australia, this time with a difference – he was already bankrupt in New Zealand. Bank of Western Australia (Bank) v David Stewart Henderson (No. 3) [2011] FMCA 840 is another Australian cross-border insolvency case in which we have successfully tested the boundaries of the Cross-Border Insolvency Act 2008 (Cth) (the CBIA), this time with the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).

Introduction

New Zealand liquidators have had their powers recognised in Australia in a series of recent ground-breaking judgments.

These decisions in respect of Northern Crest Investments Limited, a New Zealand registered company listed on the ASX, demonstrate the broad powers which the courts are willing to provide to foreign representatives under the Cross-Border Insolvency Act 2008 (Cth) (the CBIA).

Obtaining powers of Australian liquidators

Everyone loves a bargain – accordingly, there is a lot of interest when liquidators and other insolvency practitioners put a business up for sale. Purchasers jostle like shoppers in the Myer stocktake sale, trying to position themselves as the perfect purchaser. At the same time they try to convey their concern about the value of the business or assets – everyone expects a discount for a distressed business.

On 24 November 2009, ASIC released Consultation Paper 124 which provides guidance for directors on their duty to prevent insolvent trading which is imposed by section 588G of the Corporations Act 2001.

The economic climate over the past two years has seen a growing number of corporate insolvencies. There is also evidence that directors, and particularly directors of small to medium size enterprises, do not fully understand their duty to prevent insolvent trading.

Before 1993, the question of whether a creditor of a corporation being wound up had received an unfair preference from that corporation was determined under section 122 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). In 1993, a new Part 5.7B was inserted into the Corporations Act to deal with voidable transactions such as unfair preferences. Since then two lines of divergent judicial authority have developed:

Introduction