Although most western legal systems have recognised for some decades the public benefit in rehabilitating failed enterprises, some countries do it better than others. To some extent, this is because of differences in local legislation (sometimes small, but with far-reaching effects), which either shapes, or is shaped by, popular or political attitudes to business failure.

In response to the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic in Australia in 2020, the federal government injected an unprecedented level of stimulus into the Australian economy and introduced temporary law reforms aimed at protecting against an anticipated "tidal wave" of insolvencies. These temporary law reforms included a moratorium on civil liability for insolvent trading for directors and increased thresholds and time frames for responding to statutory demands.

During the better part of 2020, the federal government has injected an unprecedented level of stimulus into the Australian economy in an attempt to mitigate the economic impact of COVID-19. As a result, despite a significant contraction in the Australian economy, roughly half as many Australian companies are entering insolvency processes today compared with the same time last year. As that stimulus is wound back, it seems inevitable that the number of insolvencies will rise.

In Short

The Situation: In Australia, the Takeovers Panel ("Panel") is the primary forum for hearing disputes in relation to takeover bids and other corporate control transactions involving public companies. In light of the current COVID-19-led financial distress being experienced by many companies, understanding when the Panel will be the appropriate forum to consider disputes in relation to a company in administration is important. This question arose in the course of the current Virgin Australia Group administration.

In Short

The Situation: When determining and quantifying unfair preference claims in Australia, does the Corporations Act permit liquidators to value transactions forming part of a single "continuous business relationship" (such as a running account) from the point of peak indebtedness, even if doing so disregards earlier transactions that might act to reduce the value of the claim against the creditor?

In Short

The Situation: Should liquidators be personally liable for the costs of unsuccessful appeals, without an entitlement to reimbursement by the company or its creditors in relation to those costs?

The Conclusion: The general rule providing a liquidator immunity from personal costs orders and entitling a liquidator to be indemnified from the assets of the company for their own costs, and for the costs of the other party, does not apply when a liquidator initiates an unsuccessful appeal.

In Short

The Situation: Should liquidators be removed under section 90-15 of the Insolvency Practice Schedule (Corporations) in circumstances where they engaged in preappointment discussions with a secured creditor, allegedly failed to investigate the company's affairs promptly, and retained the company's preappointment solicitors?

In Short

The Situation: A liquidator can reject a "double proof" for what is, in substance, the same debt as another accepted proof of debt.

The Question: When are liquidators justified in rejecting what could arguably be a double proof?

The Federal Court of Australia rules that receivers appointed to a company in liquidation are entitled to pay employee entitlements and fees.

In Short

The Situation: Section 553C of the Corporations Act 2001 (WA) ("Act")provides that if a creditor and a company in liquidation have mutual dealings, the creditor must offset any sum the creditor owes to the company in liquidation against debt owed by the company.

The Question: Does the existence of a third party security interest over circulating assets (floating charge) which are intended to be set off against other debts prevent the dealings from being "mutual"?