Does a lender have a duty to act in good faith when negotiating with a borrower during a commercial loan modification? In an order issued recently by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, in In re: Burcam Capital II, LLC, the court denied a lender’s motion to dismiss a borrower’s claims against the lender. The Borrower alleged that the lender’s failure to modify the terms of the loan constituted a breach of the lender’s obligation to deal with the borrower in good faith, as well as an unfair or deceptive trade practice.&nbs
In re Zais Investment Grade Ltd. VII1 is the latest in a recent line of bankruptcy cases challenging bedrock assumptions regarding securitization special purpose entities (SPEs) and bankruptcy considerations in securitization transactions.2 Zais establishes precedent allowing a senior noteholder of a collateralized debt obligation (CDO) to place the CDO issuer in an involuntary chapter 11 bankruptcy in order to advance an asset management plan that would otherwise require supermajority approval of all noteholders (including all junior classes) under the related indenture.
On September 7th, the FDIC announced the launch of a new program to encourage small investors and asset managers to partner with larger investors to participate in the FDIC's structured transaction sales for loans and other assets from failed banks. The Investor Match Program will help to facilitate partnerships in order to bring together sources of capital and expertise. Participants in the program will use a customized database to identify potential collaborations, which will be identified at the sole discretion of the participating firms.
In a tumultuous year that is likely to be remembered for its extreme market volatility, skyrocketing commodity prices (e.g., crude oil hovering at $100 per barrel), a slumping housing market, the weakest U.S. dollar in decades versus major currencies, a ballooning trade deficit with significant overseas trading partners such as China, Japan, and the EU , and an unprecedented proliferation of giant private equity deals that quickly fizzled when the subprime mortgage meltdown made inexpensive corporate credit nearly impossible to come by, 2007 was anything but mundane.
As recently reported in our Fall 2007 issue, Judge Lifland’s decision in In re Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Master Fund, Ltd.,1 limited the ability of offshore funds in financial distress to utilize chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code.
On September 7, the U.S. Treasury Department and the Federal Housing Finance Authority (FHFA) placed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into conservatorship, and announced (i) Treasury’s entry into a Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement with each Government Sponsored Entity (GSE), (ii) the creation of a Government Sponsored Entity Credit Facility (GSECF), and (iii) the adoption of a GSE Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) Purchase Program.
Bankruptcy Court Hearing Regarding Sale of Lehman’s Investment Management Division
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (“LBHI”) and its affiliate and subsidiary debtors (collectively, “Lehman”) filed their proposed chapter 11 plan of reorganization in their jointly administered chapter 11 proceedings on Monday, March 15, 2010 (Docket No. 7572). Monday was the last day for Lehman to file a plan pursuant to section 1121(d) of the Bankruptcy Code in order for Lehman to maintain the exclusive right to file and obtain confirmation of a plan.¹
In a recent decision,1 Judge Sweet of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York affirmed a bankruptcy court decision and refused to recognize under chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code either as “foreign main proceedings” or as “foreign nonmain proceedings” the well-publicized liquidations brought in the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands by two Bear Stearns hedge funds (the “Funds”).
In the current market turmoil, several banking and insurance names have already had to be rescued by government-brokered packages. It is therefore timely to review what rights institutional investors have in the event of counterparty insolvency. Unfortunately, the picture is complicated, not just because the question of how pension fund investors can get their money back may have an international dimension, but also because governments keep moving the goalposts on the availability and adequacy of compensation schemes.
Where does the claim arise?