目前对于陷入困境但仍具备重整价值及重整可行性的企业而言,破产重整是其实现风险出清和企业重生的重要方式。在破产重整中,投资人参与的主要方式包括股权投资、资产投资和债权投资等,其中股权投资为较为重要的投资方式(其基本流程如下图),本文将结合实践,从投资人视角,浅析破产重整中股权投资的机遇和风险防范,以期为投资人参与重整投资提供帮助。
图1:破产重整中股权投资基本流程图
一、重整投资的机遇
现阶段,重整投资作为“新一轮招商引资”处于重要机遇期。以上市公司重整为例,2023年7月底的数据显示其中超90%的产业投资人和财务投资人账面呈现浮盈[1];2024年以来,截至11月,有44家上市公司被申请重整及预重整,较前一年同期增加超四成[2]。由此可见,破产重整蕴含着较多投资机会,其在目前政策环境、价值发掘、成本控制和业务整合等方面均展现出投资“机遇”。
It is not uncommon for contractors, in several industry sectors, to contract with a special purpose vehicle (SPV), whose day-to-day management is effectively controlled by a parent company, and the SPV has with little to no assets beyond cash flow provided by its parent. In this article we look at what a claimant could do outside of the traditional insolvency process in circumstances where the SPV goes into a form of external administration such as administration or liquidation and there are no assets available to the external administrators.
在当前的投融资环境下,国资背景的投资方常常承担着地方政府的返投任务,对被投企业的注册地点存在特定诉求,因此,若被投企业未注册在此类投资方期待的特定地区,则投资方可能会要求被投企业迁址以实现当地的招商引资。市场上已出现部分项目的投资方以此作为投资交割的前提条件。
优质企业无疑都是各地的“心头肉”,能为当地带来税收效益、工作岗位等。因此,企业的迁出之路可能面临迁出地政府“不放手”、迁出和迁入程序衔接不顺畅等一系列疑难问题,可能拉长迁址进度,甚至实质上无法最终完成迁址。
为协助企业顺利实现“迁址”目的,我们在相关交易中对企业迁址的命题进行重新思考和思路转换。事实上,除了直接变更注册地址,企业也可考虑通过股权重组进行股权结构的调整,以满足投资方对于变更融资主体及后续上市主体所在地的需求。但此等“重组式迁址”也并非一路坦途,如有不慎,同样可能面临法律和税务的障碍和风险,因此需要提前对这类重组交易进行审慎考量和规划。
一、直接迁址的障碍和难点
Liability management transactions which may favour a subset of creditors over another are increasingly common in the US leveraged finance markets. 2024 may be seen as the year in which these US imports began to make a real impact in Europe. Which strategies could creditors employ to protect themselves from unfavourable treatment where such transactions are attempted?
The securitization or structured finance market has evolved from its early origins focused primarily on financial assets (e.g., mortgages, receivables, loans credit card accounts, etc.) to the world of non-traditional or esoteric securitizations with exciting new assets.
Following an overhaul of the Singapore insolvency regime which came into force on 30 July 2020, the insolvency and restructuring framework was consolidated in the omnibus Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018 (IRDA). One of the key features of the IRDA was to amend the then-existing construct of statutory avoidance actions in Singapore.
Overview of statutory avoidance provisions following IRDA
The US appears likely to enter a default cycle in the near future, according to senior fund managers and economists. A recent bout of M&A transactions involving chapter 11 cases point in the same direction. Taking deals involving bankruptcy cases as a proxy for distressed M&A, 16 such transactions were announced in the US in Q1, up 14.3 percent year on year, according to Dealogic. The aggregate value of those deals reached US$1.8 billion, a gain of 76 percent from the same period in 2023.
In Foo Kian Beng v OP3 International Pte Ltd (in liquidation) [2024] SGCA 10 (OP3 International)1 the Singapore Court of Appeal considered the trigger for when the director's duty to consider the interests of creditors is engaged (referred to in the judgment as the Creditor Duty).
The Court held that:
In 2023, we saw an increase in both voluntary administration and receivership appointments in Australia. In the context of Australia's economic climate this was unsurprising — debtor companies were grappling with volatile markets, supply chain disruptions and uncertain economic conditions, and secured lenders were invoking either or both of these regimes as a means of protecting their investments.
Investors in the Australian market are more sophisticated than ever and – unsurprisingly – so too are the restructuring transactions being promoted by these investors. One such transaction is the credit bid. While not a transaction structure that is formally recognised in Australia, a credit bid is a valuable tool in a financier's playbook that can be implemented to achieve a return where the original financing is unable to be repaid in accordance with its terms.
Credit Bidding