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Standard Profil’s scheme of arrangement was sanctioned by the English High Court on 9 September 2025, notwithstanding a recent Frankfurt court decision casting doubt on whether English restructuring plans and schemes of arrangement proposed by German companies would be capable of sanction by the English courts going forward as a result of recognition issues (see ‘More on this topic’).

When a company is in financial distress, directors face difficult choices. Should they trade on to try to “trade out” of the company’s financial difficulties or should they file for insolvency? If they act too soon, will creditors complain that they should have done more to save the business? A recent English High Court case raises the prospect of directors potentially being held to account for decisions that “merely postpone the inevitable.”

When a company is in financial distress, its directors will face difficult choices. Should they trade on to trade out of the company's financial difficulties or should they file for insolvency? If they delay filing and the company goes into administration or liquidation, will the directors be at risk from a wrongful trading claim by the subsequently appointed liquidator? Once in liquidation, will they be held to have separately breached their duties as directors and face a misfeasance claim? If they file precipitously, will creditors complain they did not do enough to save the business?

This is the second in a series of articles on how the changes introduced by the 2024 JCT (Joint Contracts Tribunal) contracts will impact the practical administration of the JCT contractual mechanisms.

In this article, we look specifically at the insolvency related provisions in the 2024 Design and Build (D&B) contract and the 2024 Intermediate Building Contract with Contractor’s design (ICD) contract. We address the updates to the definition of insolvency, the impact of those changes for Employers and Contractors and the related knock-on impact to sub-contracts.

On July 2, 2024, the Court of Appeal for British Columbia (the “Court”) released its highly anticipated decision in British Columbia v. Peakhill Capital Inc., 2024 BCCA 246 (“Peakhill”) concerning the use of reverse vesting orders (“RVOs”) to effect sale transactions structured to avoid provincial property transfer taxes for the benefit of creditors.

Many litigators and corporate lawyers view the practice of representing a large shareholder and the company in which it is invested as common practice. In many instances, no conflict of interest will ever materialize such that the shareholder and the company require separate representation. However, in a recent opinion rendered by the United States Bankruptcy Court, Eastern District of Virginia (the “Court”), a large international law firm (the “Firm”) was disqualified from representing Enviva Inc.

In a recent judgment1, the High Court determined (contrary to the arguments of the affected secured creditor) that a debenture created a floating charge rather than a fixed charge over certain internet protocol (IP) addresses. Whilst elements of the decision are inevitably fact-specific, some broader lessons and reminders can be taken from the judgment which will be of general relevance to lenders when taking security.

2275518 Ontario Inc. v. The Toronto-Dominion Bank, 2024 ONCA 343

On May 6, 2024, the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld a summary judgment motion decision in favour of The Toronto-Dominion Bank (“TD Bank”) in 2275518 Ontario Inc. v. The Toronto-Dominion Bank, 2024 ONCA 343.[1]

While gaining recognition of Canadian insolvency proceedings south of the border used to be wishful thinking for an insolvent Canadian entity having involvement in the cannabis industry, such proceedings are now seemingly becoming a potential option. The United States Bankruptcy Court Central District of California Los Angeles Division (the “Court”) recently dismissed the United States Trustee’s (the “Trustee”) second motion to dismiss in The Hacienda Company, LLC’s (“THC”) bankruptcy proceedings.

Introduction

Independent schools have not been immune from financial stress in recent years. Prior to the pandemic a combination of increasing staff costs, greater competition and the need for continual investment in technology and premises was already posing challenges for a number of institutions. This was exacerbated by the unique pressures of COVID, which saw income squeezed as a result of enforced school closures and reduced pupil numbers.