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The phrase “Texas Two-Step,” as used in bankruptcy, is a legal expletive. Regardless of what the details of a Texas Two-Step might be, the phrase has become synonymous with:

  • abusive behavior;
  • bad faith conduct;
  • a means for swindling creditors;
  • the antithesis of “doing what’s right”;
  • a tool for avoiding liability;
  • etc., etc.

Describing a legal tactic as a “Texas Two-Step” is like calling that tactic a “#$&*#%R&” or “#*$&.” It’s a legal expletive that means “really, really bad.”

Here’s a dilemma:

  • Should bankruptcy be available as a tool for resolving mass tort cases of all types (like it already is in asbestos contexts)?

Here’s an illustration of the dilemma:

  • many tort claimants in the Johnson & Johnson case DO NOT want bankruptcy involved; but
  • many tort claimants in the Purdue Pharma case were BEGGING the courts to approve the bankruptcy plan.

How do we solve this dilemma?

The U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion is Truck Insurance Exchange v. Kaiser Gypsum Co., Inc., Case No. 22-1079, Decided June 6, 2024.

Opinion’s Q & A

The Truck Insurance question is this:

  • Whether an insurer with financial responsibility for a bankruptcy claim is a “party in interest” under § 1109(b)?

The Supreme Court’s answer is this:

On April 23, 2024, the American Bankruptcy Institute’s Subchapter V Task Force issued its Final Report.

This article is the eighth in a series summarizing and condensing the Task Force’s Final Report into “a nutshell.” The subject of this article is:

  • whether the Subchapter V trustee or other party in interest should be allowed to file a plan after debtor’s removal from possession.[Fn. 1]

Recommendation

An important decision on the “boundary issue” between arbitration and insolvency came out this week. One that has troubled me in the past.

Question: Can you wind up a company for a debt due under a contract containing an arbitration agreement or do you have to go through arbitration first? Up until now, you had to get an arbitral award first, regardless of whether the debt was disputed.

But now, unless the debt is disputed on genuine and substantial grounds, you can press ahead with applying for a winder. So said the Privy Council today.

We have a direct statutory conflict:

  • one statute requires an ERISA dispute to be resolved in arbitration; but
  • a bankruptcy statute requires the same dispute to be resolved in bankruptcy.

Which statute should prevail? The bankruptcy statute, of course.

  • That’s the conclusion of In re Yellow Corp.[Fn. 1]

Statutory Conflict

The In re Yellow Corp. case presents a direct conflict between these two federal statutes (emphases added):

On April 23, 2024, the American Bankruptcy Institute’s Subchapter V Task Force issued its Final Report.

This article is the seventh in a series summarizing and condensing the Task Force’s Final Report into “a nutshell.” The subject of this article is:

  • whether the $7,500,000 debt cap for Subchapter V eligibility should remain or revert to an interest-adjusted $3,024,725.

Recommendation

On April 23, 2024, the American Bankruptcy Institute’s Subchapter V Task Force issued its Final Report.

This article is the sixth in a series summarizing and condensing the Task Force’s Final Report into “a nutshell.” The subject of this article is:

  • whether a Subchapter V trustee should act as a mediator.[Fn. 1]

Recommendation

In Mitchell and others v Al Jaber; Al Jaber and others v JJW Ltd [2024] EWCA Civ 423 the Court of Appeal has confirmed that a director remained subject to a continuing fiduciary duty post liquidation when purporting to transfer assets owned by that company, on the basis he was an “intermeddler”. While the case concerned a BVI company, the court’s decision was based on English-law authorities and therefore has wider significance.

Facts

Subchapter V relieves small business debtors from the absolute priority rule.”[Fn. 1]

  • This was the excuse for a contorted grammatical interpretation, against the debtor, of a Subchapter V statute by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals gives the same excuse for the same contorted grammatical interpretation — like this: