Early engagement, targeted information requests and use of the court's disclosure powers may assist consideration of whether to support or oppose a plan
Since their introduction in 2020, restructuring plans have become increasingly common in the retail and consumer sectors, including fitness centres (Virgin Active and Fitness First), casual dining (Prezzo) and, most recently, in greeting cards and gifting (Clintons).
HMRC has taken an increasingly active role in opposing restructuring plans with which it does not agree
Previously in this series, we explored whether restructuring plans present an alternative to formal insolvency, as well as the court's ability to exercise a cross-class cram down on opposing creditors.
The new law emphasises preventive restructuring, cross-border cooperation and equitable treatment of creditors
The European Union has recognised the need for harmonised insolvency laws across its member states and has taken a significant step forward with the introduction of the new EU Restructuring Directive ((EU) 2019/1023).
This directive aims to establish a common framework for insolvency proceedings, thereby enhancing cross-border cooperation and safeguarding the interests of all stakeholders involved.
Even if the statutory conditions for cramming down the votes of dissenting creditors has been met, the court retains a discretion to consider other factors
Certain statutory conditions need to be met in order for the court to sanction a plan at least one class of creditors or members has not voted in favour of the plan by the requisite majority (being 75% in value of those present and voting) – referred to as the "cross-class cram down".
Demonstrating that dissenting creditors are no worse off under a contested restructuring plan than in the relevant alternative is an essential requirement for the court to exercise its power to sanction the plan
The power of the court to sanction a restructuring plan where one or more classes of creditors or members has not voted in favour of the plan by the requisite majority (being 75% in value of those present and voting) is referred to as the "cross-class cram down".
Demonstrating what would most likely happen if a restructuring plan were not sanctioned is an essential element for the exercise of the court's discretion to cram down the votes of dissenting creditors
Restructuring plans under Part 26A of the Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006) may provide an alternative for companies in financial distress to formal insolvency (see our previous Insight).
Restructuring plans can provide companies in the early stages of financial difficulty with a flexible alternative to entering a formal insolvency procedure
Under Part 26A of the Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006), companies or groups encountering financial difficulties affecting their ability to carry on business can propose a compromise or arrangement (a restructuring plan) which mitigates or eliminates the effects of those financial difficulties.
引言
按照《中华人民共和国企业破产法》(“《企业破产法》”)第三十二条[1]规定,管理人有权起诉请求法院撤销破产企业在一定期间内的个别清偿行为。债权人在面对该类个别清偿撤销诉讼时,时常面临举证困难、法律适用不明确等困境。
我们近期代理某金融机构债权人处理一宗个别清偿纠纷诉讼二审程序。本文将尝试结合这一案件,提出我们对上述法律规定的思考,讨论债权人应对个别清偿撤销诉讼的“困境”与“突围”,并且为债权人提供缓释该类纠纷带来的潜在风险的思路。
一、债权人应对个别清偿撤销纠纷的困境
为充实破产企业偿债资产、维护债权人公平受偿,《企业破产法》赋予管理人针对债务人破产前一定期间内特定行为的撤销权。本文关注的是《企业破产法》第三十二条指向的债务人在破产申请受理前6个月内的个别清偿行为,或称“偏颇性清偿行为”。依照该条规定,撤销该类行为需要满足以下条件:
The preliminary draft of the law on structural changes of commercial companies approved by the Spanish Government on 14 February (the "Preliminary Draft") aims to transpose Directive (EU) 2019/2121 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2019 amending Directive (EU) 2017/1132 regarding cross-border transformations, mergers and demergers of companies