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GoFirst’s insolvency has highlighted issues surrounding the insolvency resolution of commercial airlines. This article analyses the issues facing stakeholders, and the adequacy of extant regulations to address these.

A "Liquidation Preference" is a clause in investment and shareholders’ agreements that determines the order in which proceeds from a liquidity event (such as a trade sale or asset sale) are distributed among different shareholders. This clause often pertains primarily to preferred shareholders, such as venture capital investors.

The Federal Labour Court (Bundesarbeitsgericht, BAG) had to decide in which case a social compensation plan endowment by the conciliation committee is economically unjustifiable for a company outside of insolvency. This shall be the case if the fulfilment of the social compensation plan obligation would lead to illiquidity, balance sheet over-indebtedness or an unacceptable reduction of the company's equity. If the endowment was economically unjustifiable, the discretion of the conciliation committee was exceeded and the social compensation plan therefore invalid.

Das Bundesarbeitsgericht (BAG) hatte darüber zu entscheiden, wann eine Sozialplandotierung durch die Einigungsstelle für ein Unternehmen außerhalb der Insolvenz wirtschaftlich unvertretbar ist. Dies sei der Fall, wenn die Erfüllung der Sozialplanverbindlichkeit zu einer Illiquidität, einer bilanziellen Überschuldung oder einer nicht mehr hinnehmbaren Schmälerung des Eigenkapitals der Gesellschaft führe. Liege danach eine wirtschaftliche Unvertretbarkeit vor, sei das Ermessen der Einigungsstelle überschritten und der beschlossene Sozialplan unwirksam.

This article was first published on India Business Law Journal on 22 June 2023.

In M Suresh Kumar Reddy v Canara Bank and Ors, the Supreme Court clarified that its observations inVidarbha Industries Power Limited v Axis Bank Limited were restricted to the particular facts of that case. Therefore, except in exceptional circumstances, National Company Law Tribunals (NCLT) must admit applications under section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC), once the existence of a debt and default is established.

The Department of Telecommunications is seeking to overhaul the law governing the provision of telecommunication services through the Draft Telecommunication Bill, 2022. The Bill also seeks to govern the provision of telecom services and, or, availability of network during insolvency proceedings in respect of a telecom licensee or assignee. While the DoT’s rationale for this is understandable, the proposed provisions may conflict with the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

This article examines the NCLT and NCLAT’s power to exercise contempt jurisdiction under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, and the inconsistent approach taken by different benches.

Although the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (Code) was initially hailed as a welcome reform that would enable timebound and effective insolvency resolution, its tenure has been fraught with issues and uncertainty. One of the issues that remains open is the power to punish for contempt under the Code.

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 was enacted, amongst others, to facilitate timely insolvency resolution. While the Supreme Court has always upheld the sanctity of timelines under the Code for corporate insolvency resolution, it has held the prescribed timelines for actions prior to the commencement of the corporate insolvency process as merely directory. This article explores the impact of such decisions on the proceedings under the Code which already suffer from inordinate delays.

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 was enacted to facilitate insolvency resolution in a timebound manner, and maximise value realisation for stakeholders. Although it has been amended 6 times since its notification, issues remain. As the Legislature appears set to amend the Code once again, this article examines stakeholders’ issues and explores the issues the amendments may address.