The Bombay High Court recently quashed a provision of a central government office memorandum that enabled public sector banks to request issuance of look out circulars (LoCs) against wilful defaulters. In Viraj Chetan Shah v Union of India, the court held that this provision violated the fundamental right to life (Article 21) as well as the fundamental right to equality (Article 14). The government is reportedly contemplating a statutory basis for PSBs to initiate LoCs.
The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) has been at loggerheads with the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) on various occasions in the corporate insolvency resolution process (CIRP) of a distressed entity. Courts and tribunals have passed varying judgments, either giving primacy to the IBC or allowing the Enforcement Directorate (ED), a functionary under the PMLA, to perform its duties irrespective of the ongoing CIRP of a company.
The rights of secured creditors under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (Code) have been a matter of continuous litigation and uncertainty. Early on, the challenge presented itself when during the insolvency resolution of Essar steel (India) Ltd., the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) directed the distribution of resolution plan proceeds equally amongst all classes of creditors, including financial, operational, secured and unsecured creditors.
Bankruptcy law has always been an interesting area to practice and study in China. Having nominally a “socialist market economy” as per its Constitution, China allows its private sector to operate relatively freely within regularly re-defined boundaries but has a strong state-owned sector that comprises about half of the entire economy. Adding constant concerns about social stability in the country of 1.4 billion people, the rules for companies going into insolvency must be a careful balance between capitalist “freedom to fail” principles and governmental control over the economy.
在中国，破产法一直是一个有趣的实践和研究的领域。自从社会主义市场经济被写入我国宪法，我国就允许私营企业在定期不断重新界定的范围内相对自由地经营，同时约占整个经济一半的国有企业也展现出其雄厚的实力。在这个拥有14亿人口的国家，社会稳定问题一直备受关注，因此企业破产制度必须在资本主义“允许失败的自由”原则和政府对经济的管控之间保持谨慎的平衡。
中国的破产法从业人员一直热切期待新的并且能够对公司何时以及如何进行破产清算与重整产生影响的法律法规出台。中华人民共和国第十四届全国人民代表大会常务委员会第七次会议于2023年12月29日审议并通过了新修订的《中华人民共和国公司法》（简称“新公司法”），将自2024年7月1日起正式实施。本文将从破产实务的角度对新公司法进行解读。
Bankruptcy law has always been an interesting area to practice and study in China. Having nominally a “socialist market economy” as per its Constitution, China allows its private sector to operate relatively freely within regularly re-defined boundaries but has a strong state-owned sector that comprises about half of the entire economy. Adding constant concerns about social stability in the country of 1.4 billion people, the rules for companies going into insolvency must be a careful balance between capitalist “freedom to fail” principles and governmental control over the economy.
During summer 2023 the Swedish Government Official Report (SOU 2023:34) (the “Report”) was published proposing, inter alia, the removal of the requirements of a limited liability company to prepare a control balance sheet (Sw. Kontrollbalansräkning) and eventually enter into liquidation upon shortage of own capital. Instead, the suggestion was that the emphasis should be shifted more towards liquidity and solvency. The Report has now been through a referral process and by 15 December 2023 various referral bodies had submitted their responses to the Report.
A "Liquidation Preference" is a clause in investment and shareholders’ agreements that determines the order in which proceeds from a liquidity event (such as a trade sale or asset sale) are distributed among different shareholders. This clause often pertains primarily to preferred shareholders, such as venture capital investors.
The Federal Labour Court (Bundesarbeitsgericht, BAG) had to decide in which case a social compensation plan endowment by the conciliation committee is economically unjustifiable for a company outside of insolvency. This shall be the case if the fulfilment of the social compensation plan obligation would lead to illiquidity, balance sheet over-indebtedness or an unacceptable reduction of the company's equity. If the endowment was economically unjustifiable, the discretion of the conciliation committee was exceeded and the social compensation plan therefore invalid.