A CVA was introduced as one of the rescue arrangements under the Insolvency Act 1986. It allows a company to settle unsecured debts by paying only a proportion of the amount owed, or to vary the terms on which it pays its unsecured creditors. Whilst a CVA only requires approval of a 75% majority of the creditors by value, it binds every unsecured creditor of the company, including any that voted against it or did not vote at all.
In Rubin v Coote [2011] EWCA Civ 106 (09 February 2011) the Court of Appeal has upheld the decision of a liquidator to settle litigation against a former director of a company notwithstanding the opposition of the company’s creditors.
It is an age old problem for creditors who are faced with debtors who ask for more time to pay their debts. The Civil Procedural Rules (CPR) 14.9 and 14.10 allow for a debtor, following the admission of their debt, to request time to pay. It is open for a claimant to choose whether or not to accept a defendant’s proposals; if the claimant does not accept the defendant’s proposals, it is for the court to determine the time and rate of payment. The court’s discretion conferred by CPR 14.10 to extend time for payment has not, until now, been examined.
Toward the end of 2009 the Republic of Ireland’s then government passed legislation which would lead to the creation of the National Assets Management Agency (NAMA). The role of NAMA was a simple one: to remove toxic debt from the books of the Irish banks to assist in attempts to revive the national economy. The security would be acquired at a discount and purchased with Government backed bonds. In the first phase of NAMA (focusing on mortgages and other secured facilities with a minimum value of £20m) over £80bn in toxic debts were acquired.
In what circumstances might an individual administrator be liable for discrimination against employees of companies in administration? This was the question the Employment Tribunal asked itself in the case of Spencer v Lehman Brothers (in administration) and others.
Corporate Debt Restructuring through a Company Voluntary Agreement
In the current economic climate most businesses will experience temporary or longer term cash flow pressure resulting in stressful trading and creditor pressure.
Since the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006 were made in order to implement the European Union’s Council Directive 80/987/EEC, there has been an ongoing debate on how regulation 8 (7) (the bankruptcy proceedings exception) should be interpreted. Fortunately, a recent decision by the Employment Appeals Tribunal has gone some way towards clarifying the issue.
The implications of taking an appointment over an insolvent business which is regulated by environmental law can be far reaching. Environmental regulation has become more stringent and the sanctions for breach can leave the IP exposed to liability, including (amongst other things) costs sanctions.
The main environmental regimes referred to in this update are the contaminated land and water pollution regimes.
Insolvency procedures involving companies are complex and generally take a long time to complete. There is plenty of jargon which adds to the confusion, whereas all that an unsecured creditor usually wants to know is how to make a claim for the monies owed to him by the company, to whom the claim should be made, how long it will take to decide the claim and whether there is a possibility of recovering any monies from a company which is obviously experiencing financial difficulties.
The underlying policy of the Insolvency Act 1986 is that all assets of an insolvent organisation must be made available for distribution amongst its creditors. However, the courts also have the power to prevent parties from contracting out of the statutory regime. This long established common law principle known as the anti-deprivation principle has been used by the courts over the years to strike down contractual provisions which attempt to do just that. The principle has received an airing in two recent High Court decisions.