Every business must manage risk. Whenever such risk turns into reality, the consequences must be accepted and declared for the well being of the wider economic environment. The purpose of this article is to analyse the legal framework of the commencement of insolvency proceedings at a debtor’s request and the sanctions applicable when such a framework is surpassed.

The collection of the insolvency estate is one of the important phases of insolvency proceedings. The Bulgarian Commerce Act (Issue No. 48 dated 18 June 1991, as amended) (the “Act”) provides certain tools to facilitate the collection of funds and other assets in order to “maximise” the insolvency estate. One such tool is the ability of the insolvency administrator, or the creditors to the insolvency estate, to challenge the validity of acts and transactions performed by the insolvent company after the insolvency trigger date.

Following last edition’s article on the insolvency proceedings of the market-leading Czech betting company, we would like to provide an update on the progress of the company’s insolvency proceedings.

On August 26, 2011 the Italian Supreme Court issued the decision no. 32899 stating that shareholders of a company will commit an offence if they unreasonably provide funds to a company in distress, rather than proceeding with the immediate liquidation of the company.

From 4 August 2011 special insolvency rules now apply to those Hungarian companies which the Government classifies as “highly important” from a national economic perspective. Insolvency proceedings can be started as a special procedure.

Classification

The ongoing financial crisis has given rise to an increase in financial restructurings for many German companies, as a way of avoiding possible insolvencies. German companies have taken various approaches towards the painful process of restructuring. For instance, they have streamlined their operations, cut costs and raised capital.

An English rugby club (an unincorporated association of its members) engaged the services of Barnes Webster & Sons (BWS), a construction company. The club’s treasurer signed the contract, which was witnessed by Davies, the club’s president. The club agreed to pay BWS a fixed price plus additional amounts for certain variations in the work, should they arise. The variations were required, but the club did not pay the £147,000 bill for them that BWS presented. BWS made a demand on Davies personally, which he moved to set aside.

The District Court in Manhattan seems to have put the nail in the coffin of triangular set-off in insolvency – that is, the ability of affiliates to set off their claims against an insolvent debtor: In re Lehman Brothers Inc. (SDNY, 4 October 2011).

Saul Katz and Fred Wilpon, owners of the New York Mets baseball team, invested in Bernard Madoff’s Ponzi scheme. Irving Picard, the trustee appointed under the Securities Investor Protection Act to liquidate the business of Madoff and Madoff Securities, sought to recover over $1 billion from Katz and Wilpon on the grounds that they had made money from Madoff through fraud, constructive fraud and preferential transfers in violation of federal bankruptcy law and New York debtor-creditor law.

In 2002 a European subsidiary of Lehman Brothers created a complicated synthetic debt structure called Dante, which was intended to provide credit insurance for another subsidiary, LBSF, against credit events affecting certain reference entities, the obligations of which formed the reference portfolio. A special purpose vehicle issued notes to investors, the proceeds of which were used to purchase collateral which vested in a trust. The issuer entered into a swap with LBSF under which LBSF received the income on the collateral and paid the issuer the amount of interest due to noteholders.