Cognac Ferrand S.A.S. v. Mystique Brands LLC, No. 20 Civ. 5933 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2021) [click for opinion]
The COVID-19 pandemic has put the rescue of struggling but viable businesses front of the agenda. The initial response of the Belgian government and legislator was a moratorium on enforcement measures and bankruptcy petitions. Such moratorium can however not be a structural solution in the long term, and expired on 31 January 2021.
In brief
The COVID-19 pandemic has put the rescue of struggling but viable businesses front of the agenda. The initial response of the Belgian government and legislator was a moratorium on enforcement measures and bankruptcy petitions. Such moratorium can however not be a structural solution in the long term, and expired on 31 January 2021.
In brief
In brief
Creditors commonly find that their applications to wind up a company are suddenly deferred at the last minute by the appointment of a voluntary administrator. Now, in the early days of the small business restructuring (Part 5.3B) process, the courts are already grappling with those circumstances in the context of that new regime. At the time of writing1, only four restructuring appointments under Part 5.3B have been notified to ASIC. Two of them have been the subject of court proceedings.
The resulting decisions reveal:
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently affirmed the dismissal of a borrower’s petition seeking relief under the federal All Writs Act for purported violations of the automatic bankruptcy stay in continued foreclosure proceedings and purported violations of the borrower’s rights to remove the state court proceedings to the bankruptcy court.
In brief
In brief
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently held that loans incurred by a debtor to pay university tuition were “qualified education loans” under the Bankruptcy Code and thus were not dischargeable.
In so ruling, the Sixth Circuit rejected the debtor’s arguments that:
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently held that property in which a debtor’s dependent son lived part-time with his father qualified for the so-called homestead exemption contained in section 522(d)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, regardless of state law.