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Last week at the American Bankruptcy Institute meeting in Washington, D.C., our firm co-sponsored and participated in a mini-conference on bankruptcies that involve FCC-regulated companies. This was an opportunity to spend a few hours contemplating issues that practicing attorneys rarely get a chance to reflect upon in the midst of heated, multi-party bankruptcy proceedings.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, on March 19, 2014, held that a corrupt debtor’s pre-bankruptcy cash transfer to a commodity broker was a “settlement payment” made “in connection with a securities contract,” thus falling “within [Bankruptcy Code] §546(e)’s safe harbor” and insulating the transfer from the trustee’s preference claim. Grede v. FCStone, LLC (In re Sentinel Management Group, Inc.), 2014 WL 1041736, *7 (7th Cir. Mar. 19, 2014).

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, on Feb. 21, 2014, affirmed the dismissal of a bankruptcy trustee’s fraudulent transfer complaint against a “warehouse” lender who had been paid by a distressed home mortgage originator several months prior to the originator’s bankruptcy. Gold v. First Tennessee Bank, N.A., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 3279 (4th Cir. Feb. 21, 2014) (2-1). Affirming the lower courts, the Fourth Circuit held that “the bank accepted the payments” from its borrower “in good faith.” Id., at *2.

Setoff provisions are commonly found in a variety of trading related agreements between hedge funds and their dealer counterparties. Last November, Judge Christopher Sontchi of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware held that “triangular setoff” is not enforceable in the context of a bankruptcy case.[1] “Triangular setoff” is a contractual right of setoff that permits one party (“Party One”) to net and set off contractual claims of Party One and its affiliated entities  against another party (“Party Two”).

We recently wrote about the highly controversial decision of the Delaware Bankruptcy Court in In re Fisker Automotive capping a secured creditor’s right to credit bid its $168 million claim at $25 million.[1] The secured creditor immediately appealed to the District Court.[2] As a procedural matter, the secured creditor had an absolute right to have its appeal heard only if the Bankruptcy Court’s ruling was considered a “final order.” If it was not a “final order,” then the District Court had discretion on whether to hear the merits of the appeal. On Feb.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held on Jan. 27, 2014 that a lender’s acceleration due to a borrower’s payment default did not trigger a prepayment premium. In re Denver Merchandise Mart, Inc., 2014 WL 291920, *1 (5th Cir. Jan. 27, 2014) (“Denver Merchandise”). Affirming the lower courts’ application of state law, the court held that “the plain language of the contract does not require the payment of the Prepayment Consideration in the event of mere acceleration.” Id. at *5.  

Relevance

According to a recent report issued by the American Bankruptcy Institute, there was a 24 percent drop in business  bankruptcy filings in the United States last year, resulting in the fewest filings since 2006. The larger corporate  filings in 2013 were not the typical “mega” filings of years past. Unlike Lehman, Chrysler, Tribune, MF Global  and others, the chapter 11 “mega-cases” filed in 2013 were smaller and less well known in the general business  community. Among the more prominent were Cengage Learning, Excel Maritime, and Exide Technologies.

On Jan. 10, 2014, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the “Court”) in In re Fisker Automotive Holdings, Inc., et al., capped a secured creditor’s right to credit bid its $168 million claim at only $25 million (the amount it paid to purchase the claim). The decision is on appeal. While the Court stated that its decision is non-precedential, it serves as a cautionary tale for secured lenders who also are potential acquirers of a debtor’s assets in bankruptcy sales.

Facts

Loan to Fisker

A New York bankruptcy court has ruled that certain victims of Bernard Madoff’s highly publicized Ponzi scheme are not entitled to adjust their claims to account for inflation or interest. Securities Investor Protection Corporation v. Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC, 496 B.R. 744 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013). The Madoff Liquidation Trustee brought the motion asking the court to determine that Madoff customers’ “net equity” claims did not include “time-based damages” such as interest and inflation under the Securities Investor Protection Act (“SIPA”).