In another case involving administrators, an employment tribunal somewhat controversially has held that the individual administrators could be liable as principals in an agency relationship with employees of a company in administration.

Toward the end of 2009 the Republic of Ireland’s then government passed legislation which would lead to the creation of the National Assets Management Agency (NAMA). The role of NAMA was a simple one: to remove toxic debt from the books of the Irish banks to assist in attempts to revive the national economy. The security would be acquired at a discount and purchased with Government backed bonds. In the first phase of NAMA (focusing on mortgages and other secured facilities with a minimum value of £20m) over £80bn in toxic debts were acquired.

A CVA was introduced as one of the rescue arrangements under the Insolvency Act 1986. It allows a company to settle unsecured debts by paying only a proportion of the amount owed, or to vary the terms on which it pays its unsecured creditors. Whilst a CVA only requires approval of a 75% majority of the creditors by value, it binds every unsecured creditor of the company, including any that voted against it or did not vote at all.

In Rubin v Coote [2011] EWCA Civ 106 (09 February 2011) the Court of Appeal has upheld the decision of a liquidator to settle litigation against a former director of a company notwithstanding the opposition of the company’s creditors.

It is an age old problem for creditors who are faced with debtors who ask for more time to pay their debts. The Civil Procedural Rules (CPR) 14.9 and 14.10 allow for a debtor, following the admission of their debt, to request time to pay. It is open for a claimant to choose whether or not to accept a defendant’s proposals; if the claimant does not accept the defendant’s proposals, it is for the court to determine the time and rate of payment. The court’s discretion conferred by CPR 14.10 to extend time for payment has not, until now, been examined.

In what circumstances might an individual administrator be liable for discrimination against employees of companies in administration? This was the question the Employment Tribunal asked itself in the case of Spencer v Lehman Brothers (in administration) and others.

Corporate Debt Restructuring through a Company Voluntary Agreement

In the current economic climate most businesses will experience temporary or longer term cash flow pressure resulting in stressful trading and creditor pressure.

Since the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006 were made in order to implement the European Union’s Council Directive 80/987/EEC, there has been an ongoing debate on how regulation 8 (7) (the bankruptcy proceedings exception) should be interpreted. Fortunately, a recent decision by the Employment Appeals Tribunal has gone some way towards clarifying the issue.

On February 7, 2011, in In re DBSD North America, Inc.,1 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit released its opinion joining the Third Circuit in condemning socalled “gifting plans,” thus deepening the perceived circuit split with the First Circuit which has been interpreted as approving of gifting plans. In so doing, the Second Circuit relied on the U.S. Supreme Court cases of Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship2 and Norwest Bank Worthington v.

The current "Great Recession," which began in late 2007 with a maelstrom in the debt capital markets, has necessitated a rethinking of the federal income tax rules governing debt restructurings. The harsh rules2 promulgated by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in reaction to the 1991 taxpayer-favorable decision in Cottage Savings v. Commissioner,3 have been inhibiting restructurings. Instead, rules that did not trigger adverse tax results have been needed to induce lenders and borrowers to restructure obligations that can no longer be paid according to their terms.