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Becoming the first Court of Appeals to address an issue that has divided the bankruptcy and district courts, the Ninth Circuit adopted a forceful view of Stern v. Marshall,1 to hold in In re Bellingham Insurance Agency, Inc.2 that absent the parties’ consent, the limitations imposed by Article III of the Constitution deprive a bankruptcy judge of the constitutional authority to enter judgment on fraudulent transfer claims brought against parties who have not filed proofs of claim.

The effects of the recent fi nancial crisis and the ensuing recession continue to take their toll on municipalities in the United States, which are struggling with reduced revenues at the same time their residents have an increased need for government services.

Law Decree No. 83/2012, providing “Urgent Measures for the Country's Development”

Law Decree No. 83 of 22 June 2012 (the “Decree”), effective as from 26 June 2012 and converted into law with amendments1, has introduced important measures aimed at stimulating the Italian economy (also referred to as “Decreto Sviluppo”).

The Decree, consisting of seventy articles, sets forth a heterogeneous set of rules, including, among other provisions, significant amendments to the Italian Bankruptcy Law.2

In a surprising decision certain to reinvigorate the ongoing debate about the scope of Stern v. Marshall, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted a broad view of Stern and held that the structural nature of the limitations imposed on bankruptcy courts by Article III of the Constitution could not be waived by a party’s failure to object at the trial court level. The decision, Waldman v. Stone, 2012 WL 5275241 (6th Cir. Oct.

"Does an insurance broker, after procuring an insurance policy for a developer on a construction project, owe a duty to apprise a subcontractor that was later added as an insured under that policy of the insurance company's subsequent insolvency?"

In this issue of first impression in California, the Fourth District Court of Appeals said "no." Pacific Rim Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. Aon Risk Insurance Services West, Inc. --- Cal.Rptr.3d ----,2012 WL 621346 (Cal.App.4 Dist.).

On June 13, 2012, the bankruptcy court for the Northern District of Texas in In re Vitro, S.A.B. de C.V. (“Vitro SAB”) declined to recognize and enforce an order issued by the Federal District Court for Civil and Labor Matters for the State of León, Mexico, which approved Vitro SAB’s reorganization plan in its Mexican insolvency proceeding (known as a concurso mercantil proceeding). Vitro S.A.B. v. ACP Master Fund, Ltd., et al. (In re Vitro S.A.B.), Case No. 11–33335 (HDH), 2012 WL 2138112 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. June 13, 2012).

Admonishing that motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim must be decided based on whether a plaintiff's complaint is plausible rather than how plausible it is, which was the district's view in granting a dismissal motion, the Second Circuit, in Anderson News, L.L.C. v. American Media, Inc.,[1] declared improper the district court's denial of leave to file a proposed amended complaint and vacated the dismissal.  

On May 29, 2012, the Supreme Court in In RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC (“RadLAX”) held that a Chapter 11 reorganization plan that proposes the sale of encumbered assets free and clear of liens must honor the secured creditor’s right to credit bid its claim in order to be confirmed under the “fair and equitable” standard of the Bankruptcy Code.

In the recent case of RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 2012 WL 1912197 (May 29, 2012), the Supreme Court in a unanimous 8-0 opinion, delivered by Justice Scalia, held that the Bankruptcy Code statutory scheme mandates that secured creditors must be allowed to credit-bid in 363 sales of assets where the sale is incorporated into a plan of reorganization.

On May 15, 2012, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals issued a fraudulent transfer ruling in TOUSA, Inc.'s chapter 11 case with wide-ranging implications for the financing community. As discussed herein, this decision weakens protections for secured lenders, especially when extending credit to distressed borrowers.