Last Fall, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued a decision in the Charter Communications bankruptcy case which will create additional significant challenges for those seeking to appeal confirmation of plans of reorganization that have been implemented. See 691 F.3d 476. Upon implementation (or “substantial consummation”) of the plan, the Second Circuit presumes that the appeal of such plan is equitably moot. Appellants bear the burden of overcoming that presumption.

When does the selection of a technically correct venue become “unjust”? This was the core question Judge Shelley Chapman was required to grapple with when Patriot Coal and almost 100 of its affiliates filed for bankruptcy in New York this past summer. Should it matter that Patriot Coal created the New York subsidiaries, that permitted a New York court filing, about a month prior to the actual bankruptcy filing?

In Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Chicago American Manufacturing, LLC, 686 F.3d 372, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a debtor-licensor’s rejection of an executory trademark license does not terminate the licensee’s right to use the trademark. The decision creates a circuit-level split that may invite Supreme Court review. However, no final resolution is likely soon. The Supreme Court declined to hear the case, denying a petition for a writ of certiorari in December of 2012.

Key Points

Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code provides a procedure to obtain recognition of a foreign bankruptcy, insolvency or debt adjustment proceeding (a “foreign proceeding”) in the United States. Chapter 15 draws a distinction between a “foreign main proceeding” (i.e., a foreign proceeding pending in a country where the debtor has the center of its main interests) and a “foreign nonmain proceeding” (i.e., a foreign proceeding pending where the debtor has “an establishment”).

Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code is a “safe harbor” provision which restricts a debtor’s ability to recover or “clawback” what would otherwise be “avoidable” payments made to creditors. In the recent case of Lightfoot v. MXEnergy Elec., Inc., 690 F.3d 352 (5th Cir. 2012), the Fifth U.S.

A New York bankruptcy court recently rejected a debtor’s challenge to a consensual state court judgment (“Judgment”) in favor of mortgagee, General Electric Capital Corporation (“GECC”), that had accelerated a debt and obtained a prepetition foreclosure judgment against debtor, 410 East 92nd Street (the “Hotel”), in the amount of approximately $74 million. In re: Madison 92nd St. Associates LLC, 472 B.R. 189 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012).

First and foremost here at the Drug and Device Law Blog, we like good, strong defense decisions.  If those decisions contain lessons (or reminders) for our everyday practice – so much the better.  That’s why we’ve blogged about cases that let us remind you to check publicly available information about plaintiffs, make sure the plaintiff was alive when she filed suit, and search bankruptcy filings to see if plaintiff disclosed her lawsuit.  We

There have been some important recent legal developments that will likely impact acquisition finance. This article will survey some of the more notable ones.

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, on May 15, 2012, overturned1 a prior District Court decision stemming from the bankruptcy case of Tousa, Inc., affirming a bankruptcy court’s earlier 2009 decision that had ordered the return, on fraudulent transfer grounds, of over $400 million that had been repaid to prior lenders of the Tousa parent company in connection with a secured financing to the parent and its subsidiaries.

The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Chicago American Manufacturing, LLC,¹ recently issued a decision that holds—contrary to the only other court of appeals that has addressed the issue—that rejection of a trademark licensing agreement by a debtor-licensor does not terminate the agreement and that a trademark licensee can thus continue using the license after rejection.

The Fourth Circuit’s Lubrizol Decision