Section 523(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code is clear that a debtor can discharge a debt for money obtained by a false statement respecting the debtor's financial condition unless that statement is in writing. What has not been clear is whether a debtor's false oral statement regarding a single asset is a "statement respecting the debtor's financial condition" that falls within the ambit of 523(a)(2)(A). If so, debts obtained by such a false oral statement would be dischargeable. If not, then creditors could seek to have such fraudulently obtained debts excepted from discharge.

Companies that the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) believes may be subject to FDIC receivership under the Orderly Liquidation Authority contained in Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act, and certain of their affiliates, are now subject to recordkeeping requirements related to their “qualified financial contracts”1 (QFCs).

A debtor ordinarily may discharge debts in bankruptcy, unless one of several exceptions apply. One of the preclusions to dischargeability of certain debts, found in Section 523(a)(19) of the U.S.

No, says the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in In re Cowen, adopting the minority rule and parting ways with four other Courts of Appeals.

Lender's Security Interest in Funds Lost Upon Transfer to Debtor's Counsel

The doctrine of substantive consolidation (generally- the power of a bankruptcy court to consolidate the assets and liabilities of affiliated entities in bankruptcy) is a recognized remedy exercised by bankruptcy courts – one that strikes fear into the hearts of many lenders. Justifiably so. The doctrine can be employed to order the substantive consolidation of related-debtor entities in bankruptcy and it can also be employed to substantively consolidate the assets of a debtor in bankruptcy with those of a related entity that is not a debtor in bankruptcy.

In a 2-1 opinion, the Second Circuit overruled the district court in Marblegate Asset Management LLC v. Education Management Corp., finding no violation of the Trust Indenture Act (“TIA”) in connection with an out-of-court debt restructuring.

Background

Imagine that while a bankruptcy case is pending, the debtor-in-possession or bankruptcy trustee files a state law claim against one of the estate's creditors. Presumably, if the debtor wins its state law claim, that recovery augments the bankruptcy estate and increases the amount available to pay the debtor's creditors.[1] The creditor, seeking to avoid litigating the action in the debtor's home state court, timely removes the lawsuit to federal court as permitted under 28 U.S.C.

In an order issued today, Judge Dalton of the Middle District of Florida held that in a non-bankruptcy context, allegations that collection of a mortgage debt is barred by the statute of limitations do not form a “plausible basis” for claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act, or the Declaratory Judgment Act.

On November 21, 2016, in a case entitled In re Monson,1 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's decision,2 which held that a debtor's conduct constituted a willful and malicious injury to a creditor within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(6), because the debtor injured the creditor's right to recover its loan, the injury was intended, and the debtor was conscious of his wrongdoing. Thus, the debt was nondischargeable under 523(a)(6).

Exceptions to the Dischargeability of Debt under Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code