The case confirmed that the provisions of the CPR apply to applications for an extension of time to apply for rescission of a winding up order. The case further stated that any such extensions of time should be exceptional and for a very short period.

Facts

Facts

Facts

This case concerned the rejection by the liquidators of Saff One LLP (‘LLP’) of a proof of debt lodged by ESS. The issue was whether a tax mitigation structure involving a loan to LLP for purported investment in the Ultra Green Scheme gave rise to a provable debt if the monies ‘loaned’ passed in a circle and no such investment was made.

Facts

A Trustee in Bankruptcy (‘TiB’) applied for committal of a bankrupt (‘B’) for contempt for repeated failure to provide financial information sought in conjunction with an application for an Income Payment Order (‘IPO’).

Facts

Mr Mikki is a photographer (‘the Bankrupt’). Bankruptcy was 2010 when pertinently he had a bank account with £1,500 in it and a car.

The £1,500 was spent, but £3,000 was subsequently paid in. When the account was frozen it again had £1,500 in it. After investigations it was determined that this money derived from post-bankruptcy income and was returned. Those investigations took some time and the Bankrupt demanded penal interest.

This article was first published in the LexisNexis Corporate Rescue and Insolvency Journal (2017) 2 CRI 45.

Key Issues

On March 22, 2017, the United States Supreme Court held that bankruptcy courts cannot approve a “structured dismissal”—a dismissal with special conditions or that does something other than restoring the “prepetition financial status quo”—providing for distributions that deviate from the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme absent the consent of affected creditors. Czyzewski v.Jevic Holding Corp., No. 15-649, 580 U.S. ___ (2017), 2017 WL 1066259, at *3 (Mar. 22, 2017).

Original news

Mikki v Duncan [2016] EWCA Civ 1312, [2017] All ER (D) 157 (Feb)

To start, let me introduce some familiar characters. First, an impecunious claimant who has the benefit of after the event (ATE) insurance, but the disadvantage of an incompetent solicitor. Second, a successful defendant with the benefit of a costs order and a final costs certificate, but the disadvantage of a slippery ATE insurer who has avoided the claimant’s ATE policy because of failures by the aforesaid incompetent solicitor. Different ways around this problem have been tried, and generally failed.

On January 17, 2017, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued its long-anticipated opinion in Marblegate Asset Management, LLC v. Education Management Finance Corp., 1 ruling that Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp(b) (the “Act”), prohibits only non-consensual amendments to core payment terms of bond indentures.