Credit bidding of debt held by a secured creditor at a sale of collateral under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code has become commonplace.1 Does a secured creditor have that same ability in a sale under a chapter 11 plan? Most thought so, but according to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, not always.

In a recent opinion issued in the case In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, et al., Case No. 09-4266 (3rd Cir. 2010), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that secured lenders do not have an absolute right to credit bid on all asset sales under section 1129(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code. This opinion could have a profound effect on the manner in which debtors seek approval of a sale pursuant to a plan of reorganization and, potentially, a chilling effect on the willingness of lenders to extend credit in the future.

Japanese mobile phone service operator Willcom has filed for bankruptcy protection after failing to reach agreement with creditors on the restructuring of the company’s US $2.3 billion debt load. Filed late last week under Japan’s corporate rehabilitation law, the petition ranks as the largest bankruptcy to affect a Japanese telecom carrier. It is expected to wipe out the investment of the Carlyle Group, the U.S.-based private equity firm that, in 2004, paid US $330 million for a 60% controlling stake in what was then the mobile phone unit of KDDI Corp.

Overcoming months of delay, regional local exchange carrier Fairpoint Communications filed a reorganization plan with a New York bankruptcy court that would reduce the carrier’s debt load by two-thirds and give secured creditors an ownership stake of 92% in the post-bankruptcy entity. At the same time, Fairpoint reached settlements with the states of New Hampshire and Vermont that address commitments to service quality and to the provision of broadband services in those states.

Although 2010 is still young, the bankruptcy courts have been busy interpreting Rule 2019 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure as it applies to ad hoc groups of creditors in bankruptcy cases. A ruling issued on February 4, 2010, in In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LL, Case No. 09- 11204 (Bankr. E.D.Pa.) found Rule 2019 does not apply to ad hoc groups. The score is now tied at three to three.

In a matter of first impression arising in the largest corporate bankruptcy in history, In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York invalidated a common contractual provision shifting payment priority upon the default of a swap counterparty (“Flip Clause”) in a credit-linked debt structure.1

PETER J. SOLOMON COMPANY, L.P., v. ONEIDA, LTD., CASE NO. 09-CIV-2229, 2010 WL 234827 (S.D.N.Y. JAN. 22, 2010)

Two decisions (one only weeks ago) have held that the scope of Bankruptcy Rule 2019 encompasses “informal committees” of bondholders and that such committees must comply with the extensive disclosure requirements of Bankruptcy Rule 2019.1 In a recent decision, Bankruptcy Judge Christopher Sontchi of the Delaware Bankruptcy Court came out the other way, ruling that such a committee was not a “committee representing more than one creditor” and, consequently, is not subject to Rule 2019.2 In so doing, Judge Sontchi considered but declined to follow the two decisions addressing the same issue:

The term “stalking horse” originally referred to a horse or type of screen a hunter used to conceal his position from intended prey. Today the term takes a new meaning altogether thanks to its application in the bankruptcy context. A modern day “stalking horse” is an interested buyer of a debtor’s assets who is offered incentives for being the first to announce its intent. As the initial bidder, the stalking horse sets the minimum purchase price and other terms of the transaction.

Elaborating on its Resorts decision of ten years ago concerning payments to shareholders in a public leveraged buyout,1 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently ruled in In re Plassein Int’l, Corp.2 that the “settlement payment” exemption of section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code also insulates selling shareholders in a private LBO from fraudulent transfer liability.