Australia’s corporate insolvency laws are in a process of significant change.
The latest proposed reform concerns the controversial practice of “phoenixing”. In recent months and years, phoenixing has attracted attention from a wide band of Australian regulators.
The Phoenixing Bill
We are all accustomed to seeing change of control as a mandatory prepayment event, if not an event of default, under subscription line facilities. Even the strongest sponsors accept that a lender’s analysis of a transaction is based on the current management of the fund, such that any change in control should trigger at least the right to prepayment and cancellation. While there are often points for negotiation, this premise is almost universal.
On November 30, 2018, Judge Nelson S. Román of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York issued a decision affirming the dismissal of certain claims brought by senior secured creditors against junior secured creditors concerning the alleged breach of standstill and turnover provisions in an intercreditor agreement that governed the creditors’ relationship as creditors with recourse to common collateral. SeeIn re MPM Silicones, LLC, No. 15-CV-2280 (NSR), 2018 WL 6324842 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2018) (“Momentive”).
Overview
The perception of Australia as a relatively “risky” place to sit on a board, arises in no small part from the insolvent trading prohibition in section 588G of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and how it interacts with general directors’ duties.[1]
On November 8, 2018, Judge Vyskocil of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York issued a decision dismissing the involuntary petition that had been filed against Taberna Preferred Funding IV, Ltd. (“Taberna”), a non-recourse CDO, thus ending a nearly seventeen-month-long saga that was followed closely by bankruptcy practitioners and securitization professionals alike. SeeTaberna Preferred Funding IV, Ltd. v. Opportunities II Ltd., et. al., (In re Taberna Preferred Funding IV, Ltd.), No. 17-11628 (MKV), 2018 WL 5880918, at *24 (Bankr.
Administration and deeds of company arrangement have continued to have significant influence on major restructurings in the Australian market. In larger restructurings, administrations represent significant transactions where capital is deployed strategically to acquire businesses at significant discounts. A sound understanding of the procedures is key to private equity players for many reasons. Portfolio companies can be exposed to administrations where suppliers, customers or competitors experience financial difficulties.
The dialogue is changing yet is the law enabling the practical change Directors need?
Achieving significant cultural shift in any business environment is no easy task, so it’s by no means ground-breaking to declare that after 1 year in operation, it still cannot be said that the new “Safe Harbour” legislation has resulted in a cultural change among directors.
近年来，我国宏观经济增长放缓，国家调整产业和信贷政策，并逐渐加强金融监管，商业银行的资产质量压力有所增加，十亿甚至百亿级别的债务逾期或潜在违约浮出水面。这些巨无霸级别的潜在不良贷款风险，迫切要求商业银行审查并改善贷前贷后管理中的遗漏和问题，也对商业银行的危机处理能力提出了更高的挑战。
大敌当前，痛定思痛，当危机来临时，商业银行的管理层和执行层需要的是冷静的思考、周密的策划，以及必要时刻壮士断腕的决策力。从本团队近期参与处理的几项复杂的债务逾期及潜在违约案例来看，危机的表象多种多样，除了资金周转困难带来直接的偿付危机；有的则是债务人控制人挪用公司资金投入股市炒股，有的是公司实际控制人陷入刑事调查和指控，也有的则更为隐蔽，债务人关联主体在境外受到他国政府的调查等等。这些危机虽然不一定直接表现为到期不付，但可能已经导致债务人违反融资文件的陈述、承诺条款，甚至通过交叉违约触发了违约事件或潜在违约事件。
本文旨在梳理危机处理的思路，通盘策划全面追索资产的策略，为贷款管理工作层面制定一份简介易行的“工作方案”，以便为后续的债务重组和清偿争取宝贵的时间，避免弯路：
一、梳理融资文件
As the Chinese economy enters the “new normal”, the Chinese government has been adjusting its industrial and credit-related policies and strengthening regulation of Chinese financial institutions. A large number of non-performing loans (NPLs) as well as actual loan defaults have started to surface. The risks associated with rising levels of NPLs require Chinese banks to enhance their ex ante and ex post credit risk management practices.