In Rainy Sky S.A and six others v Kookmin Bank [2011] UKSC 50, the Supreme Court provided useful guidance on the role of business common sense in construing a clause in a commercial contract, particularly in circumstances where there are competing plausible constructions, neither of which is clearly preferable on the language used alone.

The facts

The FOS opened last week for the business of being open. It is now subject to the Freedom of Information Act. However, theFOS web page on the point suggests the Service is trying to limit what will no doubt be a flood of requests.

The FOS’ web page sets out a long list of facts and figures it is most frequently asked about, organised into seven categories adopting the Information Commissioner’s model publication scheme for non-departmental public bodies covered by the FoIA.

Once triggered by a debtor's bankruptcy petition, the automatic stay suspends a parties' right to commence or continue an action against property of the debtor’s estate. In general, a party can seek relief from the automatic stay for a variety of reasons, including for cause, lack of adequate protection or that the debtor has no equity in the property and the property is not necessary for reorganization. In a case of first impression, a district court in Pennsylvania has found that an injunction enforcing a non-compete provision in a franchise agreement was not a "claim" against t

Company Insolvencies

One of the criticisms that is often made of the UK’s complex insolvency legislation is that it is too easy for the directors of a company to put it into liquidation or administration, ‘dump’ the company’s debts and then effectively start the same business again under the guise of a new company. Such phoenixism has often been of concern to HMRC both in the civil and criminal fields and prosecutions have been made against directors who have undertaken such activities on a repeated basis.

Personal Liability Notices (‘PLNs’)

On August 16, 2011, the Second Circuit held that Irving H. Picard, the Trustee for the liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC ("Trustee"), utilized the correct methodology to determine the "net equity" of each Madoff investor under the Securities Investor Protection Act ("SIPA").

On June 28, 2011, the Second Circuit, in a 2-1 decision, held that Bankruptcy Code section 546(e) shields from avoidance in bankruptcy cases an issuer's payments to redeem its commercial paper prior to maturity. See Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Alfa, S.A.B. de CV, Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. ALFA, S.A.B. de C.V., Nos. 09-5122-bk(L), 09-5142-bk (Con), 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13177 (2d Cir. June 28, 2011). The decision marks the first time an appeals court has considered whether redemption payments constitute "settlement payments" under section 546(e).

The Seventh Circuit recently held that a chapter 11 bankruptcy plan of liquidation is not confirmable over a secured lender's objection if such plan prohibits the lender from credit bidding at a sale of its collateral. In doing so, the Seventh Circuit split with the Third and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeal which have confirmed plans that block secured creditors' rights to credit bid, potentially making the issue ripe for review by the United States Supreme Court.

A recent High Court case involving unlawful loans to directors illustrates the potential pitfalls involved in calculating limitation periods, and the circumstances in which the usual six year statutory limitation period will not apply to a recovery claim against a fiduciary.

Facts

Broadside Colours and Chemicals Ltd was a family firm supplying dyes to the textile trade. The directors were Geoffrey Button, his wife Catherine Button, and their son James Button. Only the father and son were shareholders.

Last month, the United States Court of Appeals in two separate circuits held that liability insurers have standing as parties in interest to appear and be heard in an insured's Chapter 11 case where the insurer might be liable to indemnify the claims of the insured's creditors.

Prior to the 1984 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code1 (BAFJA), there was a split as to whether a transfer of title to real estate by virtue of a mortgage foreclosure constituted a transfer as defined in §101 of the Bankruptcy Code.2, 3 However, BAFJA made it clear that a “transfer” included “the foreclosure of a debtor’s equity of redemption.”4 This change in definition has a significant impact on the application of both §547 (preference) and §548 (fraudulent transfer).