In Loop 76, LLC, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit (the “BAP”) recently held that a bankruptcy court may consider whether a creditor received a third party source of payment (e.g., a guaranty) when determining whether that creditor’s claim is “substantially similar” to other claims for purposes of plan classification under 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a). In re Loop 76, LLC, 465 B.R. 525 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012).

The U.S. Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision on May 29, 2012, finding that a chapter 11 bankruptcy plan of liquidation is not confirmable over a secured lender’s objection if such plan prohibits the lender from credit bidding at a sale of its collateral.¹ See RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC et al. v. Amalgamated Bank, No. 11-166, 566 U.S. ___ (2012).

On May 14, 2012, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Heritage Highgate, Inc., et al., No. 11-1889 (3d Cir. May 14, 2012) clarified the burden of proof with respect to the valuation and ultimate allowance of alleged secured claims under Bankruptcy Code section 506(a).

In Senior Transeastern Lenders v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (In re TOUSA, Inc.), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reinstated the decision of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida (the “Bankruptcy Court”) in which the Bankruptcy Court avoided the liens given by TOUSA’s subsidiaries to new lenders and permitted the recovery of the proceeds of the new loan from other TOUSA lenders that had taken the funds in repayment of their TOUSA guaranteed loans.

It is always an interesting question as to what rights a lender has with respect to a motor vehicle owned by a consumer who becomes insolvent, and whether a secured creditor is able to seize a motor vehicle in order to satisfy an obligation due under a loan. The answer may be surprising. The recent BC Court of Appeal case, Atwal (Re) (2011 BCSC 687), highlights the rights of a debtor vis-à-vis a trustee in bankruptcy with respect to the ownership of a motor vehicle.

Whether a lease is a “true” or “finance” lease has been debated in Canadian courts for decades in many different contexts. The consequences of the categorization of a lease can have a material impact on the recovery that a lessor may have in an insolvency of its lessee. The Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench recently released its decision in the matter of Royal Bank of Canada v. Cow Harbour Ltd. and 1134252 Alberta Ltd. (“Cow Harbour”) on January 23, 2012.

Relying on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision inAT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that California’s rule against compulsory arbitration of claims for public injunctive relief was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). The Court also underscored the key points of an enforceable arbitration clause. Kilgore v. KeyBank (March 7, 2012).

Case Background

The Repair and Storage Liens Act¹ (the “RSLA”) endeavors to protect the rights of persons that maintain or increase the value of collateral though repair and/or storage services.

Lawrence Gold recently presented on abuses of the Repair and Storage Liens Act (Ontario) (“RSLA”) impacting commercial finance and insurance companies to the Ontario Personal Property Security Legislation Committee (“PPSL Committee”). As changes to the RSLA will likely not be implemented in the near future, concerns regarding abuse of lien claimant rights are of significant importance to the industry.

Arctic Glacier Income Fund (CSNX:AG.UN) (the “Fund”) has obtained creditor protection from the Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench to allow its subsidiaries to continue normal operations as the Fund seeks new investors.

The Arctic Glacier Income Fund is an unincorporated, open-end mutual fund trust. The Fund's head office is located in Winnipeg, Manitoba. Arctic Glacier's operating subsidiaries manufacture and distribute packaged ice products in Canada and United States.