On August 16, 2011, the Second Circuit held that Irving H. Picard, the Trustee for the liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC ("Trustee"), utilized the correct methodology to determine the "net equity" of each Madoff investor under the Securities Investor Protection Act ("SIPA").
On June 28, 2011, the Second Circuit, in a 2-1 decision, held that Bankruptcy Code section 546(e) shields from avoidance in bankruptcy cases an issuer's payments to redeem its commercial paper prior to maturity. See Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Alfa, S.A.B. de CV, Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. ALFA, S.A.B. de C.V., Nos. 09-5122-bk(L), 09-5142-bk (Con), 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13177 (2d Cir. June 28, 2011). The decision marks the first time an appeals court has considered whether redemption payments constitute "settlement payments" under section 546(e).
In a recent decision1 involving TerreStar Networks, Inc., and its affiliates (“TerreStar” or the “Debtors”), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that the Debtors’ noteholders held a valid lien on the economic value of a license granted to TerreStar by the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) and that nothing in Article 9 of the New York Uniform Commercial Code (the “NYUCC”) or Section 552 of the Bankruptcy Code invalidated that lien.
The Seventh Circuit recently held that a chapter 11 bankruptcy plan of liquidation is not confirmable over a secured lender's objection if such plan prohibits the lender from credit bidding at a sale of its collateral. In doing so, the Seventh Circuit split with the Third and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeal which have confirmed plans that block secured creditors' rights to credit bid, potentially making the issue ripe for review by the United States Supreme Court.
Last month, the United States Court of Appeals in two separate circuits held that liability insurers have standing as parties in interest to appear and be heard in an insured's Chapter 11 case where the insurer might be liable to indemnify the claims of the insured's creditors.
Prior to the 1984 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code1 (BAFJA), there was a split as to whether a transfer of title to real estate by virtue of a mortgage foreclosure constituted a transfer as defined in §101 of the Bankruptcy Code.2, 3 However, BAFJA made it clear that a “transfer” included “the foreclosure of a debtor’s equity of redemption.”4 This change in definition has a significant impact on the application of both §547 (preference) and §548 (fraudulent transfer).
The second priority lien held by a junior lien holder is a property interest sufficient to trigger the protection of the automatic stay.In re Three Strokes L.P., 379 B.R. 804 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2008). Inasmuch as a senior lien holder’s foreclosure proceedings would have the effect of extinguishing the debtor’s second lien interest, a court may only lift the stay and permit the foreclosure to proceed upon such senior lien holder’s showing of adequate protection.
In a recent decision, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York concluded that an investor in a Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit ("REMIC") lacked standing to object to the sale of a chapter 11 debtor's real property, despite that the property served as collateral for loans held in trust by the REMIC for the benefit of its investors.
The United States Bankruptcy Court recently denied confirmation of a bankruptcy plan even though it found that the plan's global settlement was "fair and reasonable."1 Why? Because the plan's releases were too broad and "unreasonable" for many of the constituents. The case provides a pointed lesson to creditors and debtors alike — pay attention to the releases; overdoing it may sink the whole ship.
On August 4, 2010, the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division extended equitable principles previously applied in mortgage foreclosure cases to how far an unsecured judgment creditor could go to satisfy its lien against a debtor, deciding to follow a line of cases standing for the principal that “even in the absence of express statutory authorization, a court has inherent equitable authority to allow a fair market value credit in order to prevent a double recovery by a creditor against a debtor.” Moreover, in the case, MMU of New York, Inc. v.