In Loop 76, LLC, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit (the “BAP”) recently held that a bankruptcy court may consider whether a creditor received a third party source of payment (e.g., a guaranty) when determining whether that creditor’s claim is “substantially similar” to other claims for purposes of plan classification under 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a). In re Loop 76, LLC, 465 B.R. 525 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012).

In the recent case of RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 2012 WL 1912197 (May 29, 2012), the Supreme Court in a unanimous 8-0 opinion, delivered by Justice Scalia, held that the Bankruptcy Code statutory scheme mandates that secured creditors must be allowed to credit-bid in 363 sales of assets where the sale is incorporated into a plan of reorganization.

On May 15, 2012, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals issued a fraudulent transfer ruling in TOUSA, Inc.'s chapter 11 case with wide-ranging implications for the financing community. As discussed herein, this decision weakens protections for secured lenders, especially when extending credit to distressed borrowers.

The U.S. Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision on May 29, 2012, finding that a chapter 11 bankruptcy plan of liquidation is not confirmable over a secured lender’s objection if such plan prohibits the lender from credit bidding at a sale of its collateral.¹ See RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC et al. v. Amalgamated Bank, No. 11-166, 566 U.S. ___ (2012).

On May 14, 2012, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Heritage Highgate, Inc., et al., No. 11-1889 (3d Cir. May 14, 2012) clarified the burden of proof with respect to the valuation and ultimate allowance of alleged secured claims under Bankruptcy Code section 506(a).

In Senior Transeastern Lenders v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (In re TOUSA, Inc.), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reinstated the decision of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida (the “Bankruptcy Court”) in which the Bankruptcy Court avoided the liens given by TOUSA’s subsidiaries to new lenders and permitted the recovery of the proceeds of the new loan from other TOUSA lenders that had taken the funds in repayment of their TOUSA guaranteed loans.

Relying on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision inAT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that California’s rule against compulsory arbitration of claims for public injunctive relief was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). The Court also underscored the key points of an enforceable arbitration clause. Kilgore v. KeyBank (March 7, 2012).

Case Background

This discussion is being provided to our clients and friends to analyze the challenges presented in this difficult economic environment when an FDICinsured institution experiences a capital difficulty and is directed by the Banking Regulators¹ to restore the institution's capital adequacy.² In the past four years, the FDIC has closed approximately 400 insured institutions—as of January 1, 2012, the FDIC has indicated that there were over 800 banks on its "problem bank list." The difficulties experienced by many of these institutions are summarized in this analysis—

In the most recent ruling in long-running litigation styled AMG National Trust Bank v. Ries, NO. 06-CV4337, 09-cv-3061 (E.D. Pa.) (decided Dec.

Once triggered by a debtor's bankruptcy petition, the automatic stay suspends a parties' right to commence or continue an action against property of the debtor’s estate. In general, a party can seek relief from the automatic stay for a variety of reasons, including for cause, lack of adequate protection or that the debtor has no equity in the property and the property is not necessary for reorganization. In a case of first impression, a district court in Pennsylvania has found that an injunction enforcing a non-compete provision in a franchise agreement was not a "claim" against t