In Loop 76, LLC, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit (the “BAP”) recently held that a bankruptcy court may consider whether a creditor received a third party source of payment (e.g., a guaranty) when determining whether that creditor’s claim is “substantially similar” to other claims for purposes of plan classification under 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a). In re Loop 76, LLC, 465 B.R. 525 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012).

Admonishing that motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim must be decided based on whether a plaintiff's complaint is plausible rather than how plausible it is, which was the district's view in granting a dismissal motion, the Second Circuit, in Anderson News, L.L.C. v. American Media, Inc.,[1] declared improper the district court's denial of leave to file a proposed amended complaint and vacated the dismissal.  

On May 29, 2012, the Supreme Court in In RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC (“RadLAX”) held that a Chapter 11 reorganization plan that proposes the sale of encumbered assets free and clear of liens must honor the secured creditor’s right to credit bid its claim in order to be confirmed under the “fair and equitable” standard of the Bankruptcy Code.

The U.S. Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision on May 29, 2012, finding that a chapter 11 bankruptcy plan of liquidation is not confirmable over a secured lender’s objection if such plan prohibits the lender from credit bidding at a sale of its collateral.¹ See RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC et al. v. Amalgamated Bank, No. 11-166, 566 U.S. ___ (2012).

On May 14, 2012, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Heritage Highgate, Inc., et al., No. 11-1889 (3d Cir. May 14, 2012) clarified the burden of proof with respect to the valuation and ultimate allowance of alleged secured claims under Bankruptcy Code section 506(a).

In Senior Transeastern Lenders v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (In re TOUSA, Inc.), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reinstated the decision of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida (the “Bankruptcy Court”) in which the Bankruptcy Court avoided the liens given by TOUSA’s subsidiaries to new lenders and permitted the recovery of the proceeds of the new loan from other TOUSA lenders that had taken the funds in repayment of their TOUSA guaranteed loans.

Relying on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision inAT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that California’s rule against compulsory arbitration of claims for public injunctive relief was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). The Court also underscored the key points of an enforceable arbitration clause. Kilgore v. KeyBank (March 7, 2012).

Case Background

It is not uncommon for firms to use standard language in their account agreements that creates liens on Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs). Two recent federal court decisions, however, suggest that granting such a lien on an IRA may constitute a prohibited transaction that causes these accounts to lose their tax exempt status, which in turn could potentially make IRAs subject to third-party creditor claims. These two decisions could have far-reaching implications for any firm that has used or still uses similar lien-creating language in their account agreements.

Taking the lead from its recent decision in In re River Road Hotel Partners,¹ in In re River East Plaza, LLC,² the Seventh Circuit held that a debtor cannot avoid the lien retention prong of Section 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)³ by transferring an undersecured creditor’s lien to substitute collateral as indubitable equivalence pursuant to Section 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii).

In the most recent ruling in long-running litigation styled AMG National Trust Bank v. Ries, NO. 06-CV4337, 09-cv-3061 (E.D. Pa.) (decided Dec.