The Supreme Court held 8-0 that section 1129(b)(2) of the bankruptcy code requires that if a debtor proposes to sell property under a plan of reorganization it must permit secured lenders to submit credit bids in the sale process.  The outcome is consistent with our views of the rights of secured lenders under appropriate bankruptcy practice – however, the Supreme Court’s analysis eschews policy concerns and focuses almost exclusively on the plain language of the statute and applicable canons of statutory construction.

In Senior Transeastern Lenders v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (In re TOUSA, Inc.), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reinstated the decision of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida (the “Bankruptcy Court”) in which the Bankruptcy Court avoided the liens given by TOUSA’s subsidiaries to new lenders and permitted the recovery of the proceeds of the new loan from other TOUSA lenders that had taken the funds in repayment of their TOUSA guaranteed loans.

On May 14, 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld a ruling by the Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey that the fair market value of a creditor’s collateral as of the plan’s confirmation date is the proper method of valuing a secured creditor’s claim pursuant to section 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.  The Third Circuit also adopted a “burden-shifting framework,” finding that a secured creditor will bear the ultimate burden of proving the extent to which its claims are secured pursuant to section 506(a).

Background

On May 15, 2012, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a ruling by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida, which required certain lenders to return $403 million in prepetition payments they had received from TOUSA, Inc.

On April 19, 2012, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York granted in part and denied in part JPMorgan Chase, N.A.’s motion to dismiss an adversary complaint filed by Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (“LBHI”) and its Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors. The Complaint seeks to recover approximately $8.6 billion in prepetition transfers made by LBHI to JPMorgan in the days leading up to LBHI’s bankruptcy.

On March 26, 2012, Judge Mary F. Walrath of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware refused to rule that, as a matter of law, payments made to satisfy a debtor’s obligations under a letter of credit constitute “settlement payments” protected from avoidance under section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code. EPLG I, LLC v. Citibank, National Association et al. (In re Qimonda Richmond, LLC, et al.), No. 09-10589, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 1264 (Bankr.

Last week the Court of Appeal of England and Wales handed down its decision in four appeals which raise a number of questions of construction in relation to derivatives in the form of interest rate swaps and forward freight agreements documented under the International Swaps and Derivatives Association Inc. Master Agreement (the “ISDA Master Agreement”).¹ In particular, the decision focuses on the interpretation of section 2(a)(iii) of the ISDA Master Agreement.

Key Points

Relying on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision inAT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that California’s rule against compulsory arbitration of claims for public injunctive relief was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). The Court also underscored the key points of an enforceable arbitration clause. Kilgore v. KeyBank (March 7, 2012).

Case Background

On 29 February, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom handed down its judgment on the treatment of client money that had not been segregated, or was improperly segregated, as at the date Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (“LBIE”) entered administration. The Supreme Court found that:

In the most recent ruling in long-running litigation styled AMG National Trust Bank v. Ries, NO. 06-CV4337, 09-cv-3061 (E.D. Pa.) (decided Dec.