A recent opinion by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York affirms a 2010 ruling by the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy court, which rendered certain netting and setoff provisions unenforceable in bankruptcy. The core holding – that a counterparty cannot offset pre-petition and post-petition amounts – should come as no surprise to market participants.

On January 25, 2011, Lehman Brothers filed an amended version of its plan of liquidation (the Plan). Contrasted against its predecessor version, the Plan creates some winners and some losers in terms of the percentage of projected payouts to creditors of various Lehman entities. More important than the percentage distribution, however, may be the means by which the debtors seek to fix a creditor’s claim amount. With regard to claims based on derivatives contracts, Lehman proposes to take a novel – and for holders of those claims, potentially alarming – approach.

After months of negotiations and conferences among key legislators, President Obama signed into law a final version of regulatory reform legislation on July 21, 2010. More than 2,000 pages long, the “Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act” (the Act) provides new legal guidelines for both “financial companies” and non-financial companies and instructs federal agencies to develop a myriad of regulations to enforce the concepts provided in the Act.

David Vladeck, Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection, recently sent a letter to creditors of XY Magazine, warning that the creditors’ acquisition of personal information about the debtor’s subscribers and readers in contravention of the debtor’s privacy promises could violate the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”).

In an interesting twist on a run-of-themill case regarding the personal liability of a corporate officer for unremitted sales taxes, the New York State Division of Tax Appeals held an owner (“Petitioner”) personally liable for sales tax even though the corporation was in Chapter 11 bankruptcy and was being run by a bankruptcy court-approved management company. In re Eugene Dinino, Docket Nos. 822605, 822606, 822607, 822608, 822609, 822610 (N.Y.S. Div. of Tax App. June 24, 2010).

The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York recently issued an opinion in the case of In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. that significantly restricts the scope of setoff rights for energy traders and other participants in derivatives and forward commodity markets. Traditionally, bankruptcy law has required mutuality between the debtor and a creditor as a prerequisite for the exercise of setoff rights by the creditor.

A Mississippi Bankruptcy Court recently addressed several employer defenses to liability under the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (“WARN Act”), which is noteworthy in the context of the current economy. In re FF Acquisition Corp. d/b/a Flexible Flyer, 423 B.R. 502 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. January 20, 2010).

A hotel property derives much of its value from its operator and brand. When a hotel owner is in distress with respect to its loan obligations, the operator also plays a critical role in the resolution of the workout process between the owner and the lender. The rights and obligations of the operator contained in its agreements with the owner and the lender affect any workout decision that the parties may make.

In a recent Hunton & Williams client alert, we discussed some of the issues relating to the termination of credit default swap agreements that were pending before the Lehman bankruptcy court, including the enforceability of so-called “flip clauses.” (“Swap Termination and the Subordination of Termination Payments in the Lehman Bankruptcy,” December 2009.) Recently, the court ruled for Lehman on many of these issues. The court’s ruling (Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc.

Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.’s September 15, 2008 bankruptcy was an event of default under thousands of derivatives contracts to which a Lehman entity was a party and for which Lehman Brothers Holdings was the guarantor. This default entitled the vast majority of Lehman’s counterparties to terminate these contracts, and almost all were terminated.