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Several recent cases in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York have created ambiguity about when distressed exchange offers violate Section 316(b) of the 1939 Trust Indenture Act (the “TIA”). It appears that plaintiffs’ lawyers are using this ambiguity to challenge distressed exchange offers. The threat of litigation may give minority bondholders a powerful tool to hinder less than fully consensual out-of-court restructurings and provide them with increased leverage in negotiations.

In Cato Brand Partners Pty Ltd v Air India Ltd the Supreme Court was required to consider whether or not a foreign company had grounds to challenge an application for a winding up order in circumstances where it had not sought to set aside a statutory demand within the required 21 day period.

Virtually all public indentures contain provisions allowing the issuer to cure ambiguities and make other technical changes to the debt documentation without debtholder consent. When the purported ambiguities have substantive consequences, however, issuers may not be able to get away with an amendment that lacks debtholder approval. InGSO Coastline Credit Partners L.P. v. Global A&T Electronics Ltd. (NY App. Div. 1st Dept. May 3, 2016), a New York lower court bought into a “cure of ambiguity” argument and on that basis granted a motion to dismiss.

Market participants involved in distressed exchange offers have become accustomed to grappling with the implications of Trust Indenture Act Section 316(b) in the context of potential exit consents, i.e., are the contemplated amendments to the indenture governing the securities subject to the exchange significant enough to impair or affect the right of a holder to receive payment of principal and interest on or after the due dates of the relevant note?

Last Friday, Justice Brereton finally published his reasons in Sakr Nominees Pty Ltd [2016] NSWSC 709, the latest in a series of controversial decisions on insolvency practitioner remuneration. 

In Sakr, consistently with his Honour’s previous remuneration decisions:

A typical bond indenture provides that prior to the incurrence of an event of default, a trustee’s obligations are limited to those specifically set forth in the indenture. It is only following the occurrence of an event of default that the trustee’s duties of prudent conduct seem to ripen. This often leaves trustees and bondholders in a state of uncertainty over what actions, if any, a trustee may be obligated to take as the financial condition of an issuer worsens but has not yet crossed the default line. A recent case from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Becker v.

A recent case out of the Southern District of New York, Citibank, NA, London Branch v. Norske Skogindustrier ASA(S.D.N.Y. March 8, 2016), once again illustrates the difficulty of obtaining injunctive relief against prospective indenture violations of a financially troubled issuer.

The Facts

With the current interest being focused on Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act, this may be a good time to examine the differing rights of noteholders under an indenture governed by the TIA and the rights of lenders under credit agreements governed by New York law.

On 7 December 2015, the Federal Government released the National Innovation and Science Agenda, delivering a range of new initiatives. Among the key focus areas, the Government highlighted insolvency law as a primary area overdue for reform. Whilst not introducing wholesale reforms to mimic the United States ‘Chapter 11’ framework, the targeted reforms seek to eliminate the stigma associated with business failure.

Prepackaged Bankruptcy Offers Investors a Quick Return to Liquidity Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases are typically lengthy and expensive, potentially lasting years and costing millions of dollars in fees and expenses. One valuable technique to minimize a debtor’s time in Chapter 11, reduce cost and disruption, and still secure the benefits of a Chapter 11 plan is a prepackaged bankruptcy (also called a “prepack”). In a prepack, a debtor negotiates the terms of a chapter 11 plan and solicits votes prior to the bankruptcy filing.