Sinds 1 januari 2021 zijn de Europese insolventieverordening en Brussel Ibis Verordening niet langer van toepassing op het Verenigd Koninkrijk. Bovendien voorziet de handels- en samenwerkingsovereenkomst tussen de EU en het VK niet in een specifiek erkennings- of tenuitvoerleggingsmechanisme met betrekking tot grensoverschrijdende insolventie- en herstructureringsprocedures na Brexit. De vraag rijst dus of en onder welke voorwaarden Belgische rechtbanken Engelse schemes of arrangement en restructuring plans zullen erkennen na Brexit.

Since 1 January 2021, the European Insolvency Regulation and the Brussels I Recast Regulation no longer apply to the United Kingdom. In addition, the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement does not provide any specific recognition or enforcement mechanism in relation to cross-border insolvency and restructuring proceedings following Brexit. The question thus arises if and under which conditions Belgian courts will continue to recognise UK schemes of arrangement and restructuring plans post Brexit.

The Bottom Line

When is an insurance commissioner not a governmental authority? A federal district judge reminds us that a state insurance commissioner, when acting as receiver of an insolvent insurer, acts in a different capacity to his governmental role. This principle can cause an insurance commissioner to fall outside a contractual definition of “governmental authority” even where the definition contains inclusive language on multiple capacities.

A recent decision of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court clarified the question whether a Swiss ancillary bankruptcy estate has standing to contest a schedule of claims of a bankrupt Swiss third-party debtor if the foreign bankruptcy estate filed the respective claims directly and regardless of the recognition of the foreign bankruptcy decree. In essence, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court denied the standing of the ancillary bankruptcy estate as it may in such cases not be considered a creditor of the respective claims.

The COVID-19 crisis has emphasised the importance of having performant insolvency proceedings. As of now, new measures are in force which aim to optimise the judicial reorganisation procedure. We elaborate on the three most relevant changes.

Belgian insolvency law organises two main types of insolvency proceedings: bankruptcy (faillissement/faillite) which is a winding-up proceeding and judicial reorganisation (gerechtelijke reorganisatie/réorganisation judiciaire) which is a safeguard proceeding.

This article deals with the insolvency concept of the center of main interests (COMI) under the European Union insolvency legislation, in particular Regulation 2015/848 on insolvency proceedings (the Insolvency Regulation or the Regulation).

Pursuant to the Insolvency Regulation COMI is one of the central unified and autonomous concepts¹ of the insolvent debtor, i.e. it is an insolvency concept and not a corporate law or tax concept.

The COVID-19 crisis has emphasised the importance of having performant insolvency proceedings. As of now, new measures are in force which aim to optimise the judicial reorganisation procedure. We elaborate on the three most relevant changes.

Belgian insolvency law organises two main types of insolvency proceedings: bankruptcy (faillissement/faillite) which is a winding-up proceeding and judicial reorganisation (gerechtelijke reorganisatie/réorganisation judiciaire) which is a safeguard proceeding.

This question is of particular importance considering further that the provisions of the Luxembourg Commercial Code may seem confusing when read literally and in isolation as to whether the period commences from the date of cessation of payments (cessation des paiements) alone, or the date of both the cessation of payments (cessation des paiements) and loss of creditworthiness (ébranlement du crédit) (i.e., the cumulative criteria for bankruptcy).

Overview

In In re Nuverra Environmental Solutions, Inc., Case No. 18-3084, the Third Circuit affirmed the opinion of the District Court for the District of Delaware denying the confirmation appeal of an unsecured noteholder as equitably moot. In doing so, the Third Circuit (i) refused to allow a full-class recovery, as it would unscramble the substantially consummated plan, and (ii) refused an individualized payout to the bondholder, as it would unfairly discriminate against other members of the class in contravention of the Bankruptcy Code.