California’s AB 506 process was intended to help a municipality in restructuring its debt obligations and avoid bankruptcy. However, the lessons of the bankruptcies of the City of Stockton, the Town of Mammoth Lakes and the City of San Bernardino support the reality that a meaningful restructure requires material involvement by the major stakeholders. California’s recent wave of municipal bankruptcies tend to show that the AB 506 process has not changed this reality, but rather made a difficult process longer and more arduous.
Often, corporate boards do not consider how to handle a company bankruptcy until the moment insolvency is looming.
The U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently ruled on whether section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code exempts payments for electricity provided under a requirements contract from avoidance as preferences. At least where the facts match those of the subject case, MBS Mgmt. Serv., Inc. v. MXEnergy Elect., Inc., No. 11-30553, 2012 WL 3125167 (5th Cir. Aug. 2, 2012), such payments are exempt.
In reaction to a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985), in which the court held that a licensee of patents, copyrights and trademarks loses its rights if the trustee or debtor in possession rejects a license under the Bankruptcy Code under which the debtor was the licensor, Congress enacted section 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. § 365(n)).
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Federal Reserve Board announced the process for receiving and evaluating the initial resolution plans--also known as living wills--from the largest banking organizations operating in the United States. The agencies also gave a timetable for release of the public portion of such plans, which are due on July 2.
On May 29, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, resolved a high-profile circuit split regarding the right of secured creditors to credit bid in an asset sale under a chapter 11 plan. In RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank,1 the Court held that a debtor cannot deny a secured creditor the right to credit bid as part of a chapter 11 plan providing for the sale of assets free and clear of the secured creditor’s liens on those assets.
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey recently found that a debtor’s transfer of property owned by a corporation in which the debtor allegedly held a 50% interest did not automatically constitute a transfer of assets of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate. After the debtor filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, the Chapter 7 trustee filed an adversary complaint alleging that the debtor purposefully had executed a post-petition mortgage lien on certain real property owned by a corporation of which the debtor was a 50% owner.
In a decision of considerable importance for bankruptcy debtors and lenders, the Supreme Court handed down its ruling earlier today in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, --- S.Ct. ----, 2012 WL 1912197 (2012). In this highly anticipated decision, the Supreme Court held that a debtor may not confirm a plan under the “cramdown” provision of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A) where the plan proposes to sell a secured lender’s collateral without affording the creditor the opportunity to credit-bid for the collateral.
A Ministry of Justice Report released in March 2012 has confirmed that the implementation of the Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act 2010 (the "Act") is to be delayed until 2013.
On March 20, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) proposed a rule (Proposed Rule), with request for comments, that implements section 210(c)(16) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the Dodd-Frank Act or the Act) , which permits the FDIC, as receiver for a financial company whose failure would pose a significant risk to the financial stability of the United States (a covered financial company), to enforce contracts of subsidiaries or affiliates of the covered financial company despite contract clauses that purport to terminate, accelerate, or provide