The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P. – holding that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize the release of third-party claims against non-debtors in a reorganization plan without the consent of the affected claimants – will have a lasting impact on mass tort bankruptcy cases and likely nullifies one of the primary benefits of the so-called “Texas Two-Step” strategy: obtaining third-party releases of the debtor entity’s non-debtor affiliates.
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council has decisively redrawn the boundaries between arbitration agreements and insolvency proceedings in the case of Sian Participation Corp (In Liquidation) v Halimeda International Ltd.[1]
On June 27, the U.S. Supreme Court announced a 5-4 decision rejecting the nonconsensual releases of the Sackler family in the Purdue Pharma bankruptcy case. The split is an interesting alignment of Justices: Gorsuch writing the majority opinion, joined by Thomas, Alito, Barrett and Jackson; Kavanaugh for the dissent, joined by Roberts, Sotomayor and Kagan.
Chapter 11 bankruptcy has long been thought of as anathema to commercial real estate (CRE) lenders. This is due to the debtor-friendly bankruptcy forum, particularly with respect to (i) the up to 18 month exclusivity period during which only the debtor could propose a plan of reorganization and (ii) threats of a "cram-down" plan used to lever concessions from lenders. These provisions can be, and often were, abused by debtors with no real rehabilitative intent using bankruptcy only as a leverage tool.
Insolvenzanträge von namhaften Projektentwicklern und Immobiliengesellschaften stellen die betroffenen Unternehmen und ihre Gläubiger vor große Herausforderungen und setzen die gesamte Immobilienbranche unter Druck. Gleichzeitig gewinnen alternative Restrukturierungsmethoden, die außerhalb oder bereits im Vorfeld eines formalen Insolvenzverfahrens stattfinden, zunehmend an Bedeutung.
Vor diesem Hintergrund fällt auch vermehrt das Stichwort “StaRUG“, wenn es um die Restrukturierung von immobilienhaltenden Gesellschaften geht.
The market is experiencing almost unprecedented levels of liquidity, across public and private debt and equity capital markets. This is staunching restructuring activity, which might otherwise be expected to rise (not least as pandemic-related government support starts to withdraw). There are also many companies still sponsoring defined benefit pension schemes. The statutory and regulatory landscape in this area has evolved significantly in recent months – with new powers for regulators, and new restructuring tools for debtors.
While securitisations offer numerous benefits, there are a number of important points for originators to consider to facilitate entering into a securitisation transaction and to avoid prolonged legal work further down the line. In this article, we briefly discuss essential points that originators should be aware of and discuss with prospective lenders or arrangers prior to structuring a securitisation.
A Hong Kong court has refused to sanction a scheme of arrangement, saying that practitioners should explain the key terms and effect of any proposed restructuring in a way which can be easily understood by the creditors and the court.
In Re Sino Oiland Gas Holdings Ltd [2024] HKCFI 1135, the Honourable Madam Justice Linda Chan refused to sanction a scheme of arrangement, saying that creditors had been given insufficient information about the restructuring and the scheme that would enable them to make an informed decision at the scheme meeting.
The Hong Kong Court of Appeal has finally laid to rest the vexed issue of whether an arbitration agreement or a winding-up petition should take precedence in an insolvency situation. In two parallel decisions, the Court of Appeal ruled that an arbitration agreement should be treated in the same way as an exclusive jurisdiction clause and that the principle should be given a wide interpretation.
Is it Groundhog Day for private equity backed companies struggling to cope with higher interest rates, or is it different this time? The attempts to curb inflation flowing from the re-opening of the global economy after the Covid pandemic and the war in Ukraine have seen interest rates rise globally. In this article we look back at the response to financial distress in private equity backed companies during the global financial crisis of 2007-2009 and ask if it is different this time?