This is how Tribune ends: not with a bang, but a whimper. The 12-year litigation saga, rooted in the spectacular failure of the media and sports conglomerate’s 2007 leveraged buyout, reached an end in late February with a curt “cert. denied” from the US Supreme Court.
Morgan Lewis was one of the firms that captained the defense for Tribune’s former shareholders. This post notes some lessons that we learned—and relearned.
Lesson One: Section 546(e)’s ‘New’ Safe Harbor
The Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey denied motions to dismiss the chapter 11 case of the newly created subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson, LTL Management LLC, and granted the debtor’s motion to stay prosecution of actions asserting talc related personal injuries against its J&J affiliates and the products distributors. This is the first opinion outside the North Carolina bankruptcy court approving the use of the so-called Texas Two Step as a bankruptcy execution strategy.
The Motions to Dismiss
The US Supreme Court tends to hear a couple of bankruptcy cases per term. Most of these cases deal with interpreting provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. However, every few years or so, the Supreme Court decides a constitutional issue in bankruptcy. Some are agita-inducing (Northern Pipeline, Stern), some less so (Katz). The upcoming case is a little more nuanced, but could have major consequences.
Insight
Consider a lender that extends a term loan in the amount of $1 million to an entity debtor. The loan is guaranteed by the debtor’s owner. If both the debtor and the guarantor become subject to bankruptcy cases, it is settled that the lender has a claim of $1 million (ignoring interest and expenses) in each bankruptcy case. However, the lender cannot recover more than $1 million in total in the two cases combined. (Ivanhoe Building & Loan Ass'n of Newark, NJ v. Orr, 295 U.S. 243 (1935).)
On 12 January 2022, the English High Court granted Smile Telecoms Holdings Limited’s (“Smile” or the “Company”) application to convene a single meeting of plan creditors (the super senior creditors) to vote on the Company’s proposed restructuring plan (the “Restructuring Plan”). It is the first plan to use section 901C(4) of the Companies Act 2006 (“CA 2006”) to exclude other classes of creditors and shareholders from voting on the Restructuring Plan on the basis that they have no genuine economic interest in the Company.
Background
Not so long ago US Bankruptcy Judge Robert Drain of the Southern District of New York had his time in the barrel—pilloried in the media for approving releases to members of the Sackler family as part of a bankruptcy plan that would settle global opioid-related claims against Purdue Pharma, a bankruptcy debtor, and affiliated family members and other persons who were not bankruptcy debtors.
On the 19th of August 2021, the English High Court sanctioned a Part 26A restructuring plan proposed by the administrators of Amicus Finance plc (in administration) (“Amicus”) for the company’s solvent exit from administration, enabling the company to be rescued as a going concern (the “Restructuring Plan”).
Chapter 11 plans are a form of stakeholder democracy. Elaborate rules govern voting and its consequences, and, in Section 1125(b), how acceptances—and rejections—may be solicited. Well, sort of.
Key Takeaways