T he recent surge in activity in the claims trading market in the wake of Lehman Brothers and other high-profile bankruptcies has created a backlog of open trades and heightened price volatility. This is a perilous combination. The lack of standardized trading documentation and uniform trading conventions, as well as the dramatic influx of new counterparties into the claims market, are factors that have contributed to longer settlement timeframes and increased uncertainty in the market.
A group of creditors learned the hard way that there may be no excuse for a late claim. U.S. Bankruptcy Judge James Peck of the Southern District of New York recently disallowed seven proofs of claim that had been filed late in the Lehman bankruptcies. Judge Peck held that the reasons cited by the parties for the late filing did not rise to the level of “excusable neglect” and he was thus disallowing their claims. This is of particular interest as it comes out of the Southern District of New York, which has one of the largest bankruptcy dockets in the country.
In our Distressed Investor Alert dated December 23, 2009, we wrote that Bankruptcy Rule 2019, an often ignored procedural rule in U.S. bankruptcies, had returned to the public eye in light of the controversial revisions to Rule 2019 (“Revised Rule 2019”)1 proposed by the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States (the "Rules Committee").
Scenario:
The Eleventh Circuit recently affirmed the avoidance of nearly $2 million in postpetition payments made by debtor Delco Oil, Inc. (the "Debtor") to its petroleum supplier Marathon Petroleum Company, LLC ("Marathon").[1] The Eleventh Circuit held that funds received by Marathon from the Debtor constituted cash collateral that the Debtor had spent without the permission of either its secured lender, CapitalSource Finance ("CapitalSource"), or the bankruptcy court and, therefore, could be avoided under sections 549(a) and 363(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (“LBHI”) and its affiliate and subsidiary debtors (collectively, “Lehman”) filed their proposed chapter 11 plan of reorganization in their jointly administered chapter 11 proceedings on Monday, March 15, 2010 (Docket No. 7572). Monday was the last day for Lehman to file a plan pursuant to section 1121(d) of the Bankruptcy Code in order for Lehman to maintain the exclusive right to file and obtain confirmation of a plan.¹
Bankruptcy Rule 2019, an often ignored procedural rule in U.S. bankruptcies, has returned to the public eye with a vengeance in light of a recent ruling by the influential Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware¹ and controversial pending amendments to Rule 2019 proposed by the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States (the “Rules Committee”). The amendments will be the subject of a public hearing held in New York City on February 5, 2010.²
Courts are now being asked to examine transactions which were completed during the recent exuberant period. Despite the fact that the transactions in question may have been market standard at the time, because those transactions are being scrutinized during an unprecedented economic crisis, it appears that a disproportionate amount of finger pointing – and economic loss – is being directed at secured creditors. The result is a seeming erosion of secured creditors’ rights for the benefit of unsecured creditors.
Credit agreements typically provide that any amendment permitting the release of “all or substantially all” of the collateral requires the unanimous consent of the lenders. Many market participants expect that this provision provides protection against the agent and other lenders from consenting to the sale of the collateral and releasing the corresponding liens without the consent of all lenders.
The recent steady drumbeat of Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings is producing an equally persistent corollary: creditors receiving new securities issued by the reorganizing debtor or a related party in full or partial satisfaction of the creditors’ claims. Some of these creditors-cum-investors never planned to receive securities. The paradigmatic example is a creditor that enters into a normal business transaction resulting in an obligation that the debtor company hasn’t yet satisfied when it files for reorganization.