Active participants in the derivatives market rely on the Bankruptcy Code safe harbor set forth in section 546(e) in pricing their securities. That provision restricts a debtor’s power to recover payments made in connection with certain securities transactions that might otherwise be avoidable under the Bankruptcy Code. Two high profile cases decided in 2011 addressed challenges to the application of section 546(e). The more widely reported decision (at least outside the bankruptcy arena) was in connection with the Madoff insolvency case. See Picard v.

In a September 7, 2010 article, the Wall Street Journal reported an uptick in bankruptcy claim activity by traders and the desire of the traders to not comply with certain bankruptcy disclosure requirements that applied to “committees.” The Journal highlighted one case where Bankruptcy Judge Brendan Shannon of the Delaware District Court held the following exchange with a lawyer for certain bondholders: “‘Are you a Committee?’ The lawyer began to answer, ‘Well, actually Your Honor, we are a group of - -’.

The Issue

The issue is whether a Chapter 11 plan can be crammed down over the secured lender’s objection where the plan provides for the sale or transfer of the secured lender’s collateral with the proceeds going to the secured lender without the secured lender having the right to credit bid for is collateral up to the full amount of its claim.  

Can a U.S. patent licensee whose license has been rejected by a licensor under foreign law in a foreign bankruptcy rely on the protections of § 365(n) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code? On October 28, 2011, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia issued an opinion addressing this in the Chapter 15 case of Qimonda AG (“Qimonda”).⁵ The bankruptcy court held that the application of § 365(n) to executory licenses to U.S. patents was required to sufficiently protect the interests of U.S.

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York recently issued a decision that will significantly limit the chances of success for many claims that the trustee of the Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities (“BLMIS”) estate, Irving Picard, has brought against former investors in BLMIS to recover funds for the estate. In Picard v. Katz, 11 Civ. 3605 (S.D.N.Y.), District Judge Jed S. Rakoff issued a decision that dismissed most of the causes of action brought against a group of investors under the U.S.

An article by the National Underwriter Company discusses a recent Moody’s report that asbestos claims are again on the rise after years of declining or flat claims.¹ This has led several insurers to increase their asbestos reserves and Moody’s views this trend as a warning flag for the property and casualty insurance industry as a whole.

On October 28, 2011, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia issued an opinion in the Chapter 15 case of Qimonda AG (“Qimonda”).¹ The bankruptcy court held that the application of § 365(n) to executory licenses to U.S. patents was required to sufficiently protect the interests of U.S. patent licensees under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code and that the failure of German insolvency law to protect patent licensees was “manifestly contrary” to United States public policy.

Rejection of a contract in bankruptcy may not always accomplish a debtor’s goal to shed ongoing contractual obligations and liabilities, especially when dealing with employee benefit plans. On October 13, 2011, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals highlighted this issue in its opinion in Evans v. Sterling Chemicals, Inc.¹ regarding the treatment of a pre-bankruptcy asset purchase agreement which contained a provision addressing the debtor-acquiror’s post-closing ERISA retiree benefit plan obligations to its new employees resulting from the transaction.

In the recent case of Whittle Development, Inc. v. Branch Banking & Trust Co. (In re Whittle Development, Inc.), No. 10-37084, 2011 WL 3268398 (N.D. Tex. July 27, 2011), a bankruptcy court was asked whether a preference action could be sustained against a creditor who purchased real property in a properly conducted state law foreclosure sale. Recognizing a split of authority and some contrary principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in its prior decision, BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531 (1994), the bankruptcy court found that a preference claim could be asserted.

On June 23, 2011, the Supreme Court of the United States issued the decision of Stern v. Marshall, debatably the most important case on bankruptcy court jurisdiction in the last 30 years. The 5-4 decision, written by Chief Justice Roberts, established limits on the power of bankruptcy courts to enter final judgments on certain state law created causes of action.