In a decision that may create serious problems for bankruptcy case administration, the Supreme Court this morning invalidated part of the Bankruptcy Court jurisdictional scheme. Stern v. Marshall, No. 10-179, 564 U.S. ___ (June 23, 2011). Specifically, the Court held that the Bankruptcy Courts cannot issue final judgments on garden variety state law claims that are asserted as counterclaims by the debtor or trustee against creditors who have filed proofs of claim in the bankruptcy case.

On April 26, 2011, the Supreme Court of the United States adopted amended Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2019 (“Rule 2019”). Rule 2019 governs disclosure requirements for groups and committees that consist of or represent multiple creditors or equity security holders, as well as lawyers and other entities that represent multiple creditors or equity security holders, acting in concert in a chapter 9 or chapter 11 bankruptcy case.

《国家税务总局关于纳税人资产重组有关增值税问题的公告》(02/18/2011)

The State Administration of Taxation released the Announcement onIssues Concerning Value-Added Tax Relevant to Taxpayers’ Assets Restructuring (the “VAT Announcement”) on February 18, 2011. The effective date of the Announcement is March 1, 2011.

Vendors who sell goods to customers are probably familiar with the issues that arise when the customer later files bankruptcy.

In a welcome bit of good news for lenders, US District Court Judge Gold (Southern District of Florida) reversed the portion of the 2009 bankruptcy court decision in the TOUSA, Inc. bankruptcy cases that had ordered the disgorgement of $403 million plus interest based on the holding that the amounts were received by certain lenders to the TOUSA parent in connection with a pre-petition transaction that constituted a fraudulent transfer.

On February 8, 2011, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals issued an opinion that will have a major impact on Chapter 11 plan confirmation. In consolidated appeals stemming from theIn re DBSD North America, Inc. bankruptcy case, the Second Circuit held that (1) the “gifting” aspect of the debtors’ plan of reorganization violated the absolute priority rule, and (2) the bankruptcy court did not err in designating a secured creditor’s vote as lacking “good faith” and disregarding that vote for purposes of confirmation.

The DBSD Plan

On February 7, 2011, in In re DBSD North America, Inc.,1 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit released its opinion joining the Third Circuit in condemning socalled “gifting plans,” thus deepening the perceived circuit split with the First Circuit which has been interpreted as approving of gifting plans. In so doing, the Second Circuit relied on the U.S. Supreme Court cases of Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship2 and Norwest Bank Worthington v.

The current "Great Recession," which began in late 2007 with a maelstrom in the debt capital markets, has necessitated a rethinking of the federal income tax rules governing debt restructurings. The harsh rules2 promulgated by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in reaction to the 1991 taxpayer-favorable decision in Cottage Savings v. Commissioner,3 have been inhibiting restructurings. Instead, rules that did not trigger adverse tax results have been needed to induce lenders and borrowers to restructure obligations that can no longer be paid according to their terms.

In an October 19, 2010 opinion arising out of the Scotia Pacific bankruptcy cases, the Fifth Circuit ruled that reorganized Scotia and its affiliate Pacific Lumber Company were obliged – nearly 2½ years after Scotia’s reorganization plan was consummated – to pay Scotia’s former secured lenders approximately $30 million on account of a mistake made by the bankruptcy judge in calculating the amount owed to the secured lenders for the use of their collateral during the bankruptcy cases.

The concurring opinion in a recent Third Circuit Court of Appeals case1 suggests that trademark licensees may be able to retain their rights in bankruptcy cases, even if licensors reject the license agreements. The majority did not consider whether the licensee could retain its rights. Instead, the majority held that the trademark license was not an executory contract; therefore, it could not be rejected under the Bankruptcy Code. The majority opinion applies narrowly to circumstances involving perpetual, exclusive, and royalty-free trademark licenses.