Large law firm failures typically produce lengthy and litigious bankruptcy cases. A frustrated lawyer in one such case succinctly described the essential problem: “the assets walk, talk and, worst of all, have their own counsel.” To the inherent tensions and creditor demands of any large chapter 11 case are added  the raw pain, similar to divorce, that many partners feel at the downfall of an institutio

Last month the drama surrounding Hostess’s efforts to reject various collective bargaining agreements drew to a close (pending appeal).  Bankruptcy Judge Robert Drain (in an unpublished decision) authorized Hostess to reject its existing CBAs with affiliates of the Bakery, Confectionery, Tobacco and Grain Workers International Union, and modify the terms of its expired CBAs with the Bakers’ Union on an interim basis.  The Bakers Union was the last of Hostess’s major unions holding out and refusing to accept modifications to its CBAs.  See Transcript of Hearing, In re Hoste

Chief Judge Frank Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit recently created a split of authority regarding the rejection intellectual property licenses in bankruptcy by upholding a decision protecting a trademark licensee’s ability to use a debtor licensor’s trademark after the licensing agreement had been rejected. Chicago American Manufacturing’s licensing contract with debtor Lakewood Engineering & Manufacturing authorized CAM to sell fans under Lakewood’s mark.

Summary

The recent judgment of the Supreme Court in the joined cases of Rubin and another v Eurofinance SA and others and New Cap Reinsurance Corporation (in liquidation) and another v A E Grant and others [2012] UKSC 46, issued on 24 October 2012, established that judgments avoiding pre-bankruptcy transactions (“avoidance judgments”) made by non-EU foreign courts (including U.S. bankruptcy courts) have no special enforceability status in England and Wales compared to ordinary judgments.

On August 2, 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a requirements contract for electricity is a forward contract for purposes of section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code and, therefore, settlement payments made under the contract are exempt from avoidance as preferences. Claude Lightfoot v.

On September 25, 2012, Judge D. Michael Lynn for the United States Bankruptcy Court of the Northern District of Texas held that a “tail provision” for professional fees rendered prepetition survived – and was not cut off by – the debtor’s bankruptcy filing.  In re Texas Rangers Baseball Partners, Case No. 10-43400-DML, 2012 WL 4464550 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 2012).

Background

Judge Brendan Shannon of the U.S.

On August 28, 2012, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas vacated a series of bankruptcy court rulings that had blocked Vitro SAB’s noteholders from filing involuntary bankruptcy petitions against Vitro’s non-debtor subsidiary guarantors.  In a decision authored by Chief Judge Sidney A.

I. Summary

On August 2, 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a requirements contract for the supply of electricity constituted a “forward contract” under the Bankruptcy Code and, therefore, was exempt from preference avoidance actions.  The Fifth Circuit held that the contract in this case met the plain language definition of a “forward contract,” notwithstanding the fact that it lacked fixed quantity and delivery date terms.  Lightfoot v. MXEnergy Elec., Inc. (In re MBS Mgmt. Servs., Inc.), 2012 WL 3125167 (5th Cir. Aug. 2, 2012).