The scenario has become all too familiar in recent years: a borrower defaults on a loan and, when the lender pursues the loan collateral through foreclosure or other proceedings, the borrower files for bankruptcy protection. More often than not, when the lender appears in bankruptcy court to pursue its interest in the collateral, the borrower counterattacks with a host of state law lender liability claims.

The Supreme Court of Delaware recently held that creditors of insolvent Delaware limited liability companies (LLCs) lack standing to bring derivative suits on behalf of the LLCs.

In March 2010, CML V brought both derivative and direct claims against the present and former managers of JetDirect Aviation Holdings LLC in the Court of Chancery after JetDirect defaulted on its loan obligations to CML. The Vice Chancellor dismissed all the claims, finding that, as a creditor, CML lacked standing to bring derivative claims on behalf of JetDirect, and CML appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found in favor of the trustee (the Trustee) presiding over the liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities (BMIS), affirming the Trustee’s calculation of “net equity” in the BMIS liquidation. The Trustee calculates net equity to determine the value of claims submitted by victims of Madoff’s massive fraud.

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has now weighed in on the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor provisions. In Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Alfa, S.A.B. de C.V., Docket Nos. 09–5122, 09–5142, 2011 WL 2536101 (2d Cir. June 28, 2011), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals faced an issue of first impression—whether Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, which shields certain payments from avoidance actions in bankruptcy, extends to an issuer’s payment to redeem its commercial paper made before maturity.

On June 28, 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit became the latest circuit to weigh in on the hotly contested question of whether a debtor can deny a secured creditor the right to credit bid as part of a Chapter 11 plan providing for the sale of assets encumbered by the secured creditor’s liens. InIn re River Road Hotel Partners, LLC,1 the Seventh Circuit upheld the right of secured creditors to credit bid, a decision that runs directly contrary to recent opinions in the Third and Fifth Circuits.

In a long awaited action, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) issued a final rule on July 6 which addresses the FDIC's rights and powers as receiver of a nonviable systemic financial company under the orderly liquidation authority provisions of Title II of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.

In Lehman Brothers Special Financing, Inc. v. Ballyrock ABS CDO 2007-1 Limited (In re Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc.), Adv. P. No. 09-01032 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2011) [hereinafter “Ballyrock”], the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that a contractual provision that subordinates the priority of a termination payment owing under a credit default swap (CDS) to a debtor in bankruptcy, and which caps the amount of the termination payment, may be an unenforceable ipso facto clause under section 541(c)(1)(B).

You will rely on section 355 for nonrecognition, but here you also must rely on section 332 to make the liquidations tax free, without any liquidation-reincorporation problem. It's very clear that you can get the results you want, but not clear why.

LTR 201123022 describes these facts, in simplified form:

In Geltzer v. Mooney (In re MacMenamin’s Grill, Ltd.), Adv. Pro. No. 09-8266 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. April 21, 2011), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that the safe harbor in section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code does not apply to a small, private leveraged buyout (LBO) transaction that posed no systemic risk to the stability of the financial markets.

The Court of Chancery of Delaware ruled that counsel failed to establish "excusable neglect" when it requested additional time to submit an expert witness report after the deadline for that report—as provided for in the court's previously issued scheduling order—had expired.