On June 27, 2018, the Second Circuit denied Nordheim Eagle Ford Gathering, LLC’s petition for a panel rehearing and request that the court certify issues of Texas property law to the Texas Supreme Court. The denial leaves in place the Second Circuit’s May Summary Order affirming the widely publicized decisions of the bankruptcy and district courts below which concluded that the midstream contracts could be rejected because they did not create covenants running with the land under Texas law.

Summary of Key Takeaways

On May 22, 2018, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued its decision in Franchise Services of North America v. United States Trustees (In re Franchise Services of North America), 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 13332 (5th Cir. May 22, 2018). That decision affirms the lower court’s holding that a “golden share” is valid and necessary to filing when held by a true investor, even if such investor is controlled by a creditor.

What does it take to represent a private equity client entangled in a complex restructuring involving an important investment in a portfolio company?

Ask David Meyer, the Vinson & Elkins New York-based restructuring partner who led the V&E team representing Riverstone Holdings in the restructuring of Gulf of Mexico oil producer Fieldwood Energy.

In many ways, the case serves as a template for navigating amid a set of highly challenging circumstances.

On February 27, 2018, the United States Supreme Court issued a unanimous opinion in the Merit Management Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc. case, holding that funds that are merely transferred through a financial institution are not afforded the Bankruptcy Code “safe harbor” protections of 11 U.S.C. § 546(e), which precludes the avoidance or “clawback” of certain transfers; rather, whether the safe harbor applies in a given case will depend on the whether the parties to the overarching transfer are listed as protected parties in the statute.

The Circuit Courts of Appeal have split on whether a prepetition transfer made by a debtor is avoidable if the transfer was made through a financial intermediary that was a mere conduit. Today, the Supreme Court unanimously resolved the split by deciding that transfers through “mere conduits” are not protected. This is a major (and adverse) decision for lenders, bondholders and noteholders who receive payments through an intermediary such as a disbursing agent.

In a previous article, The Eagle and the Bear: Russian Proceedings Recognized Under Chapter 15, we discussed In re Poymanov, in which the Bankruptcy Court (SDNY) recognized a Russian foreign proceeding under chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code even though the debtor had only nominal assets in the United States (the “Recognition Order”). The Bankruptcy Court had declined to rule upon recognition whether the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C.

In a previous article, Losing Momentive: A Roadmap to Higher Cramdown Interest Rates, we explored how the judicial cramdown interest rate cap was not gaining widespread traction as feared by many in response to the 2014 Momentive bench ruling upheld in a

Traditional thinking in the private placement noteholder community has been the “model form” approach to make-whole amounts created an enforceable liquidated damages claim in the event of voluntary or involuntary acceleration by the note issuer, including upon a bankruptcy filing. That thinking has been tested in the market as a result of a number of recent decisions involving public notes where courts have interpreted the specific indenture language to deny a make-whole claim.

Last year, we reported that Australia had proposed significant insolvency reforms that, in our view, are long overdue ("A Major Leap Forward for Australian Insolvency Laws").

On July 31, 2017, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York recognized a Russian insolvency proceeding as a foreign main proceeding under chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (“Code”), concluding that (i) a retainer deposited with the debtor’s attorneys in the U.S. was sufficient property within the United States to establish jurisdiction over a debtor under section 109(a) of the Code and (ii) the Russian insolvency proceeding was not “manifestly contrary to public policy of the United States.”