Under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code, a trustee or debtor-in-possession may sell property free and clear of “any interest in such property of an entity other than the estate.” Thus, a buyer can generally acquire assets from a bankruptcy estate without subjecting itself to liability or claims based on the seller’s prior actions. InMorgan Olson, LLC v. Frederico (In re Grumman Olson Indus., Inc.), No. 02-16131, 2011 WL 766661 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.

In general, substantive consolidation allows for the assets and liabilities of affiliated debtor entities to be consolidated and disbursed as if the assets were held and the liabilities were owed by a single legal entity. Unlike joint administration, which promotes procedural convenience and efficiency without affecting the substantive rights of creditors, substantive consolidation can force creditors of a solvent debtor to share in the debtors’ aggregate asset pool in parity with creditors of less solvent debtors.

Introduction

On April 26, 2011, the Supreme Court approved a number of amendments to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. In particular, the Supreme Court amended Bankruptcy Rule 2019 to clarify the disclosure required of certain parties in interest in a chapter 9 or 11 bankruptcy case.1 These amendments were drafted by a panel of bankruptcy judges and restructuring experts and are intended to resolve a split in decisions concerning the proper application of the current Bankruptcy Rule 2019.

Under the laws of the UK and Bermuda, solvent insurance companies that had ceased to write new policies have long been able to implement an orderly and expeditious run off of their businesses through court approved schemes of arrangement.

Make whole premiums sound simple; they are prepayment premiums that are supposed to “make you whole.” More precisely, make whole premiums are intended to protect noteholders (or other debt holders) from the loss of future fixed coupon interest payments due to the early repayment of debt if market interest rates have declined in the interim.

Judge Gold of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida entered an Order today granting the motions of the First and Second Lien Lenders (the Lien Lenders) to intervene in the appeal involving the Transeastern Lenders to the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals (the Transeastern Appeal). In so doing, Judge Gold accepted the proposition that the 11th Circuit’s decision on the issue of reasonably equivalent value (the REV Issue) would bind the Lien Lenders.

In Canada, as in the US, corporate debtors are permitted with court approval to obtain DIP financing on a super-priority basis. The Order typically provides protections as hard as a nutshell, including that pension claims cannot crack the shell of protection and are subordinated to the new DIP loan. A recent Canadian decision, however, held that certain pension claims could crack the nut wide open and should be paid ahead of a DIP loan. Re Indalex Limited, 2011 ONCA 265 (Apr. 7, 2011).

On February 22, 2011, Judge James M. Peck of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York issued a decision declining to modify the September 20, 2008 Sale Order that approved the sale to Barclays PLC (“Barclays”) of assets collectively comprising the bulk of the North American investment banking and capital markets business of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (“LBHI”), Lehman Brothers Inc. (“LBI”) and certain of their affiliates (together “Lehman”).

The short answer to the title question is “no.” However, under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank” or the “Act”), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) has limited “back-up” authority to place into liquidation an insurance company that (i) meets certain criteria as respects the nature of its business and (ii) is essentially “too big to fail.” This liquidation proceeding would, however, still be under the relevant state insurance liquidation laws.1