On January 15th, 2019, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Ohio held that the end user of an electricity forward contact was not entitled to the benefits of the safe harbor provisions under Section 556 of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 556 allows a “forward contract merchant” to terminate a forward contract post-petition based on an ipso facto clause in the contract and exempts such actions from the automatic stay.

The Eleventh Circuit recently found in favor of Blue Bell Creameries, Inc. by rejecting its own earlier dicta and explicitly expanding the preference payment defense known as “new value.” This provides additional protection for companies doing business with a debtor in the 90 days prior to bankruptcy.

THE SCOOP: BRUNO’S V. BLUE BELL

On May 22, 2018, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued its decision in Franchise Services of North America v. United States Trustees (In re Franchise Services of North America), 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 13332 (5th Cir. May 22, 2018). That decision affirms the lower court’s holding that a “golden share” is valid and necessary to filing when held by a true investor, even if such investor is controlled by a creditor.

The U.S. Supreme Court recently scrutinized the proper application of the safe harbor found in Section 546(e) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code1 in Merit Management Group, LP v. FTI Consulting Inc.2 While the Supreme Court's decision narrowed the reach of the safe harbor, it did little to change the landscape for the multi-billion dollar U.S. structured finance industry, including warehouse lending.

On February 27, 2018, the United States Supreme Court in a significant ruling held in Merit Management Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc. that transfers of property of a debtor in which financial institutions are mere conduits or intermediaries may be avoidable. The Court ruled that the safe harbor provisions of section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code do not protect such transfers from avoidance.

The Circuit Courts of Appeal have split on whether a prepetition transfer made by a debtor is avoidable if the transfer was made through a financial intermediary that was a mere conduit. Today, the Supreme Court unanimously resolved the split by deciding that transfers through “mere conduits” are not protected. This is a major (and adverse) decision for lenders, bondholders and noteholders who receive payments through an intermediary such as a disbursing agent.

In a previous article, The Eagle and the Bear: Russian Proceedings Recognized Under Chapter 15, we discussed In re Poymanov, in which the Bankruptcy Court (SDNY) recognized a Russian foreign proceeding under chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code even though the debtor had only nominal assets in the United States (the “Recognition Order”). The Bankruptcy Court had declined to rule upon recognition whether the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C.

In a previous article, Losing Momentive: A Roadmap to Higher Cramdown Interest Rates, we explored how the judicial cramdown interest rate cap was not gaining widespread traction as feared by many in response to the 2014 Momentive bench ruling upheld in a

The Bankruptcy Code prohibits a chapter 13 debtor from modifying a mortgage lien on the debtor's principal residence. Even in situations in which a secured creditor fails to file a proof of claim or otherwise participate in the bankruptcy proceeding, the Bankruptcy Code allows a secured creditor's lien on a primary residence to pass through the bankruptcy unaffected. However, a recent decision from a bankruptcy court in Texas illustrates the risks to secured creditors of blind reliance on these statutory protections.

Traditional thinking in the private placement noteholder community has been the “model form” approach to make-whole amounts created an enforceable liquidated damages claim in the event of voluntary or involuntary acceleration by the note issuer, including upon a bankruptcy filing. That thinking has been tested in the market as a result of a number of recent decisions involving public notes where courts have interpreted the specific indenture language to deny a make-whole claim.