Making a will is regarded by most individuals as a necessary irritant ranking in popularity somewhere below a visit to the dentist or doctor. Following the unprecedented instability in the global financial markets since 2007, “systemic” risk (posed by the potential failure of large or complex cross-border financial institutions) was identified by regulators and legislators as one of the key areas requiring better supervision, in order to prevent a similar crisis in the future.

Bankruptcy Rule 2019, an often ignored procedural rule in U.S. bankruptcies, has returned to the public eye with a vengeance in light of a recent ruling by the influential Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware¹ and controversial pending amendments to Rule 2019 proposed by the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States (the “Rules Committee”). The amendments will be the subject of a public hearing held in New York City on February 5, 2010.²

Courts are now being asked to examine transactions which were completed during the recent exuberant period. Despite the fact that the transactions in question may have been market standard at the time, because those transactions are being scrutinized during an unprecedented economic crisis, it appears that a disproportionate amount of finger pointing – and economic loss – is being directed at secured creditors. The result is a seeming erosion of secured creditors’ rights for the benefit of unsecured creditors.

A recent decision in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida, In re Tousa,[1] has received widespread attention for its near wholesale rejection of insolvency “savings clauses,” and the resulting order requiring lenders to disgorge hundreds of millions of dollars. The decision raises numerous practical problems for participants in the secondary loan and derivatives markets, and more generally for commercial lenders and borrowers.

Background

Credit agreements typically provide that any amendment permitting the release of “all or substantially all” of the collateral requires the unanimous consent of the lenders. Many market participants expect that this provision provides protection against the agent and other lenders from consenting to the sale of the collateral and releasing the corresponding liens without the consent of all lenders.

The recent steady drumbeat of Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings is producing an equally persistent corollary: creditors receiving new securities issued by the reorganizing debtor or a related party in full or partial satisfaction of the creditors’ claims. Some of these creditors-cum-investors never planned to receive securities. The paradigmatic example is a creditor that enters into a normal business transaction resulting in an obligation that the debtor company hasn’t yet satisfied when it files for reorganization.

Nothing is certain in today's financial crisis - except that the legal system will be sorting out the rights and obligations of financial market participants for years to come. This is especially true for participants in the over-the-counter derivatives markets.

This memorandum provides an overview of the practical issues facing a sub-participant under a Loan Market Association ("LMA") English-law governed sub-participation agreement as the creditworthiness of grantor deteriorates.

Boards of directors of troubled companies must balance their fiduciary obligations to shareholders and creditors. Insolvent companies owe duties to creditors and not solely to shareholders and, under evolving case law, companies acting in the "zone of insolvency" owe a duty to creditors as well as to shareholders.

The rapid growth in derivatives as hedging instruments, particularly through equity swaps, credit default swaps ("CDS") and loan credit default swaps ("LCDS"), has challenged fundamental assumptions underlying corporate governance law, federal shareholder disclosure requirements and bankruptcy law. Corporate law has long relied on a "one share one vote" model, which presumes that a shareholder's economic interests in a corporation are inextricably linked to their voting power.