On May 17, the FDIC issued a proposed rule that would require certain insured depository institutions to submit a contingent resolution plan outlining how they could be separated from their parent structures and wound down in an orderly and timely manner. Institutions with assets greater than $10 billion that are subsidiaries of a holding company with total assets of more than $100 billion would be subject to this proposal.
On April 23, the FDIC published additional Q&As on the Statement of Policy on Qualifications for Failed Bank Acquisitions (“Policy Statement”) issued in September 2009. The Q&As clarify that there is no requirement that investors must have held their ownership for a specific amount of time.
The FDIC voted to extend the safe harbor provided under 12 C.F.R. § 360.6 until September 30, 2010, from the FDIC’s ability, as conservator or receiver, to recover assets securitized or participated out by an insured depository institution. When the safe harbor was initially adopted in 2000, the FDIC provided important protections for securitizations and participations by confirming that, in the event of a bank failure, the FDIC would not try to reclaim loans transferred into such transactions so long as an accounting sale had occurred.
A corporate borrower’s bank accounts can provide powerful security for lenders, especially if the secured party knows that it can quickly and easily sweep the funds if the borrower defaults.
Trade creditors take note: even though Chapter 11 debtors may continue purchasing goods and services and may continue operating in the ordinary course of their business, an earned cash payment in the creditor’s hands may not be safe from recovery. Moreover if you are a party to a supply contract and under an obligation to continue to furnish goods or services, the payments you receive may be recoverable by a subsequently appointed trustee.
Making a will is regarded by most individuals as a necessary irritant ranking in popularity somewhere below a visit to the dentist or doctor. Following the unprecedented instability in the global financial markets since 2007, “systemic” risk (posed by the potential failure of large or complex cross-border financial institutions) was identified by regulators and legislators as one of the key areas requiring better supervision, in order to prevent a similar crisis in the future.
A recent decision in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida, In re Tousa,[1] has received widespread attention for its near wholesale rejection of insolvency “savings clauses,” and the resulting order requiring lenders to disgorge hundreds of millions of dollars. The decision raises numerous practical problems for participants in the secondary loan and derivatives markets, and more generally for commercial lenders and borrowers.
Background
Everyday, most of us in the United States encounter evidence of relentless economic globalization. Gone are the days when American-brand automobiles dominated our roads. As a result of NAFTA, fresh Mexican produce fills the shelves of our local supermarkets. You are perhaps just as likely to fly overseas on Japan Air Lines, Aer Lingus or Lufthansa as on Northwest-Delta, American or United.
As the automotive industry continues to restructure, whether through self-liquidation or government intervention, suppliers will inevitably be confronted with many of the same issues prevalent 4-5 years ago, including a supplier’s obligation to continue to provide goods post-petition and the supplier’s rights to adequate assurance as a condition to such shipment.